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This work explores the history of arc flash investigations and the basis for 
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Findings are intended to contribute to the base of knowledge and inspire further 
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Arc flash and blast are hazards unique to electrical installations.  Such 
events can start fires, destroy equipment, and severely injure or kill workers.  
NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584 are defining standards for arc flash hazard analysis 
used during system design, construction, and maintenance. Both focus on three-
phase faults for calculations since three-phase power distribution is predominant 
in utility and industrial applications.  However, discussion of arc flash in single-
phase systems prevalent in residential and commercial facilities is excluded. 
Single-phase faults can also occur in a variety of industrial and utility 
circumstances. 
This dissertation explores historic background and treatment of arc flash 
and foundation phenomena, considers IEEE results as published in the 1584-
2018 standard, and documents the author's work with single-phase arc flash. 
Experiments were performed at the Schneider Electric facility, High Power 
Lab #3 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa in June and September 2020. This facility provided 
a test article; a full suite of voltage, current, and temperature instrumentation; 
high-speed video recording; and interface for a blast pressure transducer 
provided by the principal investigator.  Test plan development used a template 
provided by Schneider.  Scenarios were peer-reviewed in advance.  
Experimental work revealed very low levels of heat released for most 
single-phase arc fault events at 434 volts and below though there was still blast, 
flash, and splatter of molten wire residue.  In contrast, single-phase events at 460 
vi 
 
volts and above produced sustained arcs, orders of magnitude more heat, and 
dangerously high levels of blast pressure. 
Conclusions drawn are that low energy single-phase systems may be at 
low or very low risk of yielding arc flash burn-related injuries resulting from 
accidental short circuits.  However, single-phase faults in systems with open 
circuit voltage at 460 volts or greater can produce significant levels of incident 
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Since the advent of electricity as a harnessed power source, its potential 
for causing harm and death has been well-understood. The lethal nature of 
electric shock was already recognized at the beginning of the competitive race to 
commercialize electricity [1, 2]. For the next 100 years, the focus of electrical 
safety was on shock hazards and the potential for faulty electrical systems to 
cause structural fires [3, 4]. A significant example was the demand for inspection 
of the electric power and light exhibit at the 1893 Columbian Exposition (Chicago 
World's Fair) following a July fire, attributed to faulty sign wiring, that resulted in 
the deaths of twelve firefighters and four bystanders [5]. This awareness 
subsequently led to the formation of both Underwriters Laboratories and the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [3, 6].  
The dangerous phenomenon identified as arc flash, or high energy arc 
fault, began rising in industry's awareness in the early 1960s even though 480-
volt three-phase systems (which are at increased risk for such events) had been 
in commercial use since the 1930s [7].  Following several injury incidents at 
DuPont facilities, Ralph Lee published a 1982 paper [8] suggesting that heat from 
arc flash events could be predicted mathematically. In 1987, Lee offered 
additional work [9] attempting to explain the explosive nature of arc flash events 
including expulsion of molten material and debris from the locus of the event. 
Four years later, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(OSHA) [10] documented recognition of arc flash as a unique cause for concern. 
At OSHA's prompting, NFPA created a new standards committee to address the 




safety standard NFPA 70E [11] was published in 1979. However, arc flash would 
not appear in 70E until 1995 [12].  
Increasing awareness of and interest in understanding arc flash events, as 
a specific aspect of arcing faults, and their potential to cause life-threatening 
burns and to start fires led several teams to investigate both arc flash incident 
energy predictions and personal protective equipment (PPE) selection [13]. 
These investigations culminated in the development of the first edition of IEEE 
Standard 1584, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, in 
2002.  Additional experimental investigations [14] added data to the collection.  
Knowledge arising from these investigations drove significant revision to the 
1584 Standard [15] and led to an increased understanding of the phenomenon, 
methods for reducing the occurrence of arc flash, and improved PPE 
specifications. 
One of the bounding conditions for the application of both NFPA 70E and 
IEEE 1584 calculations is the assumption of a three-phase fault.  This 
assumption addresses common utility and industrial circumstances.  However, 
neither speaks adequately to single-phase faults or lower energy, single-phase 
systems.  This is tacitly recognized in 1584 Section 4.11, with acknowledgment 
that suggests the calculation method may yield overly cautious results. In certain 
cases, this approach does not provide reasonable guidance for PPE selection or 




This dissertation further investigates single-phase arc flash.   
• Literature review documents past works with arcing faults and arc 
flash; foundation theory of electric arcs; basis for medical 
assessments of injury due to burn, blast, and ultraviolet (UV) 
exposure.  Selected case studies of arc flash as well as blast 
injuries and fatalities resulting from such exposure, establish 
relevance. 
• Experimental work investigates the vertical conductors in a box with 
open ends (VCB) electrode configuration common to residential 
circuit breaker panels.  This configuration may also be encountered 
in industrial applications. 
• The results section presents data from the experimental work, 
mathematical analysis, and connects results to representative past 
works.  This is followed by interpretation and conclusions. 
The objective of this work is to contribute to the subject knowledgebase 
and inspire additional work in an area directly related to electrical worker and 






Chapter Two :  





Early Work on Arcing Faults 
Since the late 1800s, arcing faults have been a subject of interest and 
concern.  American Electrician Magazine, first published in January 1887, was a 
safety-oriented and skill-of-craft periodical that regularly included articles 
describing the prevention of arcs.  The predominant interest of the electrical 
safety community in the 19th and early 20th century was fire, equipment and 
facility damage, and shock risk, consistent with the focus of the National 
Electrical Code.   
Wagner and Fountain published “Arcing Fault Currents in Low Voltage AC 
Circuits” [16] in 1948.  The investigators’ interest was arcing and bolted faults in 
metal-clad switchgear.  Their observations on experimental results were 
frequently confirmed by succeeding investigators. These observations included 
the assertion that arc currents and voltage drop values demonstrate significant 
instability even in highly controlled experimental environments. They also 
observed that voltage developed across an arc tends to fall in the range of 40% 
to 60% of line voltage.  The authors remarked that as a result of induced arc 
faults, “The [bus] bars were thrown from their positions violently.”  Since arc flash 
and arc blast were not yet topics of consideration, they did not comment on the 
nature of the forces that could have caused this violent deformation. 
Francis Shields’ 1967 paper used the term “burndown” to describe 
equipment damage due to persistent, arcing faults [17].  He went on to 
emphasize improved sensing and protection.  This treatise, like others of the 




vignettes.  It is noteworthy that Shields acknowledged the very rapid generation 
and release of large amounts of heat during such an event.  This heat would later 
come to be recognized as a hallmark of arc flash. 
What would become OSHA General Industry Safety Standard 29 CFR 
Part 1910 Subpart S (1910.301 - 1910.399) came into existence in 1970 and 
complemented Subpart R (1910.269) that covered protective equipment.  Initially, 
OSHA focused solely on the electrical safety topics and installation requirements 
identified in the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70) including shock hazard and 
faulty electrical systems causing fires [4] and combustion burns.  Arc flash, as a 
topic of awareness and concern, was not mentioned. 
J.R. Dunki-Jacobs published several articles beginning in 1972 [18] 
detailing the nature of system damage and failure due to arcing ground faults.  
Early in the 1972 paper, the author identified the change from three-phase delta 
to three-phase 4-wire WYE distribution systems as a significant contributing 
factor to an increased incidence of burndowns at that time. More significant was 
his assertion that “Due to increasing load density requirements, an increase in 
voltage to 480Y277V became an economical necessity…” since “Research has 
shown that at the lower voltage, the arcing line-to-ground fault is essentially self-
extinguishing…”.  In his 1986 paper, the author developed an analysis of arcing 
ground faults describing how single-phase faults escalated to three-phase faults 
[19], asserting that arcs to ground may generally self-extinguish. 
In 1974, H.I. Stanback, with Square D, performed a series of tests [20] on 




motor control center bus section.  This structure was chosen to contain arcs and 
sustain them rather than allowing them to blow off the ends or edges of rods or 
open-end buses.  The intention was to identify a bracketing approximation that 
could be used in system modeling.  The author’s experiments identified bus bar 
burning rate Y (a measure of arcing energy) having the following relationship to 
arcing current i: 
 𝑌 ∝  𝑖1.5 (1) 
While this experiment series again reflected the interest of the day, i.e. 
equipment damage, it also discussed results showing the self-extinguishing 
character of arcing faults at around 6 cycles (0.1s) in the 277-volt single-phase 
regime. 
By the early 1980s, the nature of electrical arcs as an ignition source was 
well-established.  It was known that, while an electrical short-circuit would yield 
nearly immediate overcurrent protective device activation, an arc through air 
would not necessarily do so and could potentially burn for several seconds and 
yield considerable heat.  Two articles by Beland [21, 22] illustrate this 
understanding. These articles included calculations and experimental results 
showing energy yield from an arc in a 30A residential circuit potentially as great 
as 19,000 joules.  The high voltage developed across an air gap, equal to the 
phase-to-phase voltage for the low voltage system Beland considers, maximized 




Initial Consideration of Arc Flash 
As early as 1968, Dow Chemical had introduced an arc flash PPE 
program though there was not yet a way to determine how much PPE was 
adequate.  In the early 1980s, DuPont Chemical began their own PPE program.  
While at DuPont, Ralph Lee became involved with arc flash injury prevention. His 
1982 paper used cable failure data in a novel attempt to show how electric arcs 
could be a source of significant radiated heat [8].  His calculations suggest 10s or 
100s of MW of heat energy, depending on plasma sphere diameter, including arc 
events with duration as short as 0.1s (six cycles of 60c/s AC).  Lee’s references 
to the surface temperature of the sun were overly dramatic.  Nevertheless, they 
emphasized the unexpected and extraordinarily high levels of energy released in 
an arc flash event when compared to the burning arc faults that researchers and 
experimenters had been concerned with up to that time. With this sobering data, 
he then cited medical thresholds [23] for what he referred to as curable, i.e., 
second degree and non-curable skin burns. He linked heat exposure and 
duration to arc energy.  This paper brought into focus industry’s awakening to an 
emergent truth:  heat from arc flash events represents a significant source of risk 
for personnel injury and death with lethal exposures possible at three feet from 
the event and significant injury still possible at ten feet. 
In 1987, Lee further developed ideas about hazards associated with arc 
events by correlating arc current and distance to pressure wave magnitude.  
Lee’s 1987 article included four examples [9] that focus on the mechanical 




the propulsion of personnel away from the event.  Two of the examples identified 
a developing awareness of another previously unexplored consequence of arc 
flash and attendant blast: expulsion of molten metal droplets and their propensity 
for causing severe burns and starting fires.  Others’ work had attributed 
mechanical damage and deformation to magnetic effects, those forces being 
undeniably extreme.  However, Lee concluded that arc flash is an explosive 
event that, apart from blasting heat, causes a powerful destructive shock. 
In a 1994 industry article [24], Heberlein et al. summarized Lee’s work on 
arc flash and arc blast and then documented a testing survey in Allen Bradley 
motor control center (MCC) equipment.  The article begins with précises of two 
events where an arc and explosion occurred during maintenance work on MCCs.  
The objective of the ten experimental tests was to develop a body of information 
regarding the containment of arc blast inside an MCC compartment.  A variety of 
conditions were explored including use of current-limiting fuses.  The article also 
identified several circumstances under which the arc was self-extinguishing.  
Since the authors were Allen Bradley employees, it is understandable that the 
results focused on the confirmation of the MCC compartment doors’ ability to 
contain an over-pressure due to arc blast. 
Development of Basis for Protective Equipment Selection 
In a series of articles and papers [25-27] written between 1996 and 1999, 
Neal, Bingham, Doughty and their colleagues at DuPont further developed basis 
information for PPE selection for protection from electrical arcs, recognizing that 




from an extensive experimental testing and modeling program, investigating arcs 
in 600V – 2400V open-air and enclosed systems.  The results of these tests 
conceptually supported Lee’s 1982 hypothesis and empirically yielded incident 
energy values at several distances from arc flash events.  The authors connected 
their results to those of Stoll and Chianta [28] to establish relationships of 
incident energy to skin burn, including the now-familiar threshold 1.2 cal/cm2 at 
18 inches.  Their 1997 article [27] detailed additional testing to establish the 
relationships between arc power, incident energy, conductor spacing, and, 
among other things, open versus enclosed arcs. 
In 1990, Stokes and Oppenlander performed a series of experiments 
collecting data on vertical and horizontal arcs burning in open air [29] and 
compared the results to those predicted by mathematical theory previously 
developed by Lowke [30].  The data concentrated on the voltage and current of 
arcs burning between electrodes with separations varying from 5mm to 500mm 
and measured for up to 0.5 sec (30 cycles of alternating current).  Of interest in 
the field of arc flash study were Stokes’ results for gaps in the range 20mm to 
100mm. These gaps aligned with the 1-inch to 4-inch spacings encountered in 
many types of commercially manufactured electrical distribution equipment.  
While at odds with the character of theoretical values predicted by Lowke (Figure 
1, page 270), Stokes’ data revealed arc energies in generally the same range: as 
high as 2MW to 8MW [29] for these spacings with burning temperatures in the 






In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a flurry of work was published that 
explored and expanded knowledge about arc flash and arcing faults. 
Jones, Liggett, Capelli-Schellpfeffer, et al. performed a series of 38 
experimental tests in 1996 [31].  Seeking to represent conditions either known to 
cause arcing faults or known from prior case studies to contribute to injuries, test 
configurations simulated foreign objects and debris (misplaced tools) and open 
cabinet doors. 
 Jones’ tests recorded temperatures, sound pressure, and photographic 
images of the induced arc flash events in 480-volt three-phase equipment.  Like 
Neal et al. [25], they found real-world simulations produced results with high 
variability in likelihood, energy yield, duration, and arc propagation. 
Building on their earlier work, in 1999, Doughty, Neal, and Floyd continued 
collecting test data.  Their subsequent paper [32] offered the following important 
conclusions about arc flash events:  
• Arc flash incident energy is directly proportional to the time duration of 
the arc. 
• Transfer of radiated heat is also a function of arc current, electrode 
configuration, and environment (enclosed or open-air). 
• Incident energy tends to peak at arc lengths greater than that where 
maximum arc power develops. 
Their tests of 600V three-phase arcs at 6 cycles duration (0.1s) yielded 




between 1 cal/cm2 and 12.5 cal/cm2 (Figure 2, page 270).  Incident energy in test 
runs correlated closely with bolted fault current and revealed that an enclosure 
will contain and focus heat in one direction such that effective incident energy on 
the discharging face can be as much as three times higher than a comparable 
arc flash in open air. 
IEEE 1584 - IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations 
[15] was initially published in 2002 and was the first standard recognized by 
many industries and countries (though not all) as providing empirical 
underpinnings that extended previous knowledge.  The arc flash incident energy 
predictions were based on data collected from hundreds of experimental runs.  
Das [33] was critical of this approach devoting an entire chapter of his 2012 
book, Arc Flash Analysis and Mitigation to it.  Nevertheless, the 2002 edition 
would prove to be only a beginning.   
Wilkins, Allison, and Lang proposed a time-domain calculation model for 
arc flash, claiming a better representation of experimental conditions than IEEE 
1584 [34, 35].  Furthermore, the authors cited anomalies resulting from the 
differences in piecewise 1584 calculation methods for high voltage and lower 
voltage systems that their unified expression approach did not exhibit.  Their 
modeling method employed non-linear resistances and first-order differential 
equations derived from straightforward node analysis and described, though did 
not detail, a computational approach to deriving arcing behavior for both three-




In 2003, 2004 and again in 2006 Stokes and Sweeting [36-38] raised 
concerns that IEEE 1584 incident energy predictions were low for systems under 
1kV because the 1584 premise was solely based on radiated heat, and because 
calorimeter placement in the standard experimental setup biased results.  The 
authors conducted several experimental tests with bus rods in a horizontal 
configuration (as opposed to the conventional IEEE vertical configuration), with 
calorimeters measuring energy delivered from the axial ends as well as normal to 
the rods’ axes and, like Jones, they incorporated high-speed photography to 
capture images of developing and collapsing arc plasma flares and clouds.  The 
authors asserted that the plasma cloud originating from an arc event was a 
significant source of convective heat transmission that was not being measured 
by others. 
Eblen and Short ran a series of 45 tests, described in their 2012 article 
[39].  They were concerned with protecting utility workers from arc flash events in 
480-volt three-phase meter bases and panels.  These tests dramatically 
supported the assertions made by Stokes and Sweeting concerning plasma 
clouds.  Figure 3, page 271, illustrates the arc flash plasma plume ejected from a 
three-phase meter base during one of these tests. 
Eblen and Short also compared their measurements to energies predicted 
by IEEE 1584.  Their findings tended to run contrary to the concerns expressed 
by Stokes.  In all cases, the authors’ measured heat and calculated incident 




The authors also considered single-phase and phase-to-phase faults in 
transformers.  Like Jones, Liggett, et al. they simulated a misplaced tool as the 
shorting mechanism for initiating a flash.  They found that in the configurations 
explored, a single-phase arc flash generally escalated to fully involve all three 
phases within ½ cycle.  
In 2013, Smoak and Keeth conducted a short series of 13 tests [40] 
simulating arcing faults in residential metering installations.  The test setup 
consisted of a 7.2kV to 240/120V utility transformer with primary fuse, a 
secondary power pedestal, and a meter socket with a bypass handle.  Electrodes 
were constructed of large gauge direct burial service entrance (URD) cable; size 
in the range of 4/0 was likely.  The authors precisely controlled the gap distance 
between the electrodes from as little as 1/24 inch up to 1 inch.  Fuse wires (the 
authors called them teaser filaments) initiated the arcs.  Measured values were 
arc current and clearing time in 60Hz cycles.  Fault currents ran as low as 1446A 






Chapter Three :  





Lee’s Initial Work 
Ralph Lee’s 1982 article documented a theoretical exercise that combined 
arc information from a cable insulation failure study performed at the University of 
Minnesota with data from skin burns to synthesize a thesis that arc flash events 
generate enough heat to radiate at a level that can cause serious or life-
threatening injury.  While not a new idea, this article was the first to clearly offer a 
suggested prediction calculation. 
Lee calculated arc energy based on the assumption that the arc path 
through air is purely resistive.  Using the RMS formula: 





to determine arc wattage based on AC current, Lee concluded that the maximum 
wattage possible for any value of arc path resistance R is calculated: 
 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑆
2  × 𝑅 (3) 
Lee thus concluded that maximum arc power is delivered at one half the 
available bolted fault current.  Lee tabulated maximum power transfer values as 
shown in Table 1, page 301. 
Lee’s calculations are based on several simplifying assumptions and 
yielded maximum values based on theoretical circumstances.  A key point to 
note is that several subsequent investigators determined that arc currents are 
highly unstable, and that arc behavior is non-linear. This instability and non-




calculations are only applicable to three-phase systems and he did not consider 
systems with phase-to-phase voltage lower than 480 volts.   
Lee’s simplifying assumptions and calculation methods were implicitly 
called into question as early as 1995 when medical professionals such as 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. [41] noted a need for “…reevaluation of the methods 
by which thermal burn severity is predicted.”  Lee’s approach has also been the 
subject of withering criticism by more recent investigators, notably such 
authorities as Stokes and Babrauskas.  Nevertheless, Lee’s work suggested 
bracketing extremes that invited future investigations. 
Stanback 
Stanback’s [20] focus also reflected the concern of the day: equipment 
damage resulting from arcs inside large gear.   
His team had conducted earlier tests in 1970 that simulated induced faults 
in a large three-phase circuit breaker panel by solidly connecting one phase to 
the fixture shell and shorting the other two phases to the shell with small-gauge 
fusing wires.  These early tests yielded arcs only between the bus bars and the 
fixture shell.  The arcs did not propagate across phases nor did they consume all 
three buses.  The author concluded that phase-to-phase arcing did not occur 
because system voltage was 280V and bus gap was 1-3/8 inch.  As available 
fault current increased from 3200A to 6600A, measured arc current as a 
percentage of available dropped from ~58% to ~41%. 
Stanback’s 1974 experimental series consisted of 38 total test runs with a 




percent of these test runs self-extinguished within 1-1/2 cycles (25 ms).  The 
author speculated that increased bus spacing, increased available current, or 
increased size of the bus (added layers of bus conductor) contributed to a 
reduction in arc stability.  The test series covered two different materials (Cu and 
Al), a range of spacings (1 inch, 2 inches, 4 inches), several bus configurations 
(1 bar, 2 bars, 4 bars), and four different available fault current values (5150A, 
9900A, 19300A, 36100A).  The consequence of this variety was that there were 
only one or two tests for each combination of the four different parameters being 
varied.  Furthermore, with 54 possible combinations, not all were examined.  
Additionally, the erratic nature of electric arcs resulted in the authors discarding 
10% of the test runs as atypical.  Nevertheless, single-phase arcs from bus to 
ground for gaps of one and two inches were consistently stable.  Measured 
arcing times ranged between 21 cycles (350ms) and 72 cycles (1200ms).  
While the investigators did apply computer-based, non-linear regression to 
yield relationships between arc current and quantity of bus and housing material 
lost, and expressed those results using statistical terminology, they did not seek 
to improve the statistical robustness of their results with increased numbers of 
test runs for each of the 54 possible combinations of material, current, spacing, 
and conductor mass.   
The initially calculated material loss equations derived from the 34 usable 
test runs yielded the following expressions for Y (material loss in cubit inches) as 




For Aluminum Bus Bars: 
 𝑌 = 1.979 × 10−6𝐼𝑎𝑟𝑐
1.473       𝑅2 = 0.9868, 𝜎 = 0.2341  (4) 
 
For Copper Bus Bars: 
 𝑌 = 8.168 × 10−6𝐼𝑎𝑟𝑐
1.251       𝑅2 = 0.9827, 𝜎 = 0.1005  (5) 
 
For 0.1” Steel Housing: 
 𝑌 = 8.168 × 10−6𝐼𝑎𝑟𝑐
1.251       𝑅2 = 0.9559, 𝜎 = 0.1151  (6) 
The authors went on to arbitrarily select an Iarc exponent of 1.5 to 
“…facilitate practical use of the damage formula concept.”  This choice seems 
unnecessary since pocket calculators were supplanting slide rules by the early 
1970s and fractional exponents shouldn’t have presented a calculation difficulty.  
However, the developed expressions, with coefficients of determination and 
standard deviation comparing favorably to the basis equations, suggest their 
choice may have been reasonable at the time. 
Stanback offered further observations about the character of the arc 
current and voltage during the test runs.  Measured arc voltage exhibited an 
approximate square wave behavior due to flattening of sine wave peaks.  Though 
not called out in the paper, this behavior is now understood to arise from the non-
linear nature of conduction in plasma.   
The author cites a historic principle that 277V single-phase arcs to ground 
will self-extinguish when arc current is less than 38% of available fault current; 
however, the author goes on to acknowledge the erratic character of arcs and 




Doughty, Neal, Bingham, Floyd 
The most common experimental methodology employed by a variety of 
investigators considered arc flash events induced on vertical copper buses, 
either in open air or inside an enclosure open on one side.  Copper slug 
calorimeters were, and continue to be, used to make emitted energy 
measurements normal to the plane of the vertical bars. 
In their 2000 paper describing the results of a series of experiments, 
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd offer a second-order polynomial expression for 
maximum open arc incident energy as a function of bolted fault current, based on 
curve-fitting their experimental data.  The data set was quite small in this case - 
four test runs in each of two configurations. 
The test setups described in their 1997 paper [27] were identical: vertical 
buses, open-air and enclosed, with calorimeters perpendicular to the axes of the 
bus rods.  Compared to modern understanding, the test data set was sparse, and 
the straightforward algebraic expressions for arc power lacked sophistication. 
By contrast, Neal, Bingham, and Doughty’s slightly earlier work developing 
protective clothing guidelines [26, 42] incorporated a testing and data collection 
sequence using single-phase arcs in the 600V to 2400V regime.  Arc events 
were initiated with electrode gaps varying between 1 and 7 inches. For open-
circuit voltage equal to 630V, arc voltages developed in the approximate range of 
400V to 450V and measured incident energies ranged between 4.5 cal/cm2 and 
8 cal/cm2 (Figure 4, page 271).  Tests were limited to six cycles (100ms) to 




While experimenters have suggested that single-phase arcs are difficult to 
initiate or maintain, this set of experiments and Stanback’s work amply 
demonstrate that single-phase arcs will persist and yield considerable energy.  
ASTM 
Coincident to and supported by the work of Neal et al., the American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) published tentative test method PS57 
for determining flammability of flame retardant (FR) material in PPE.  This 
method, and its current successors F1958 and F1959 [43], used and still use a 
single-phase arc, generated between two electrodes, spaced 12 inches apart, 
and initiated with a fuse wire.  The fuse wire was, and remains, the method of 
choice for starting an arc in all controlled experimental environments where 
system voltage is less than the breakdown potential of air.  While the objective of 
the test method was PPE flammability testing, and the 12-inch gap used in this 
test was so large as to apply only to utility voltages, this test method 
demonstrated that single-phase arcs can be established and source enough heat 
to ignite nearby materials. 
NFPA 70E 
The 2015 revision of NFPA 70E requires that risk assessment and 
mitigation be performed for all electrical work.  The procedural content does not 
dictate the method for conducting arc flash calculations.  Various calculation 




Annex D assembles the work of several investigators to date, attempting 
to cover all situations.  The Annex begins with a repetition of Ralph Lee’s 
calculation method directly from his 1982 paper [8] followed by a collection of 
sample calculations.  The method is described as “…conservative over 600V and 
becomes more conservative as voltage increases.”  Lee did not consider 
systems below 480 volts.  More recent data show that incident energy results 
calculated using this method for utility distribution systems are excessive. 
The next section repeats the work of Doughty, Neal, and Floyd [32] for 
arcs in open air and arcs in a box.  Calculations are limited to three-phase arc 
currents between 16kA and 50kA. 
The third section repeats the calculations found in IEEE 1584-2002.  The 
general limitations identified are for three-phase systems 208V to 15kV, 0.7kA to 
106kA fault currents, and with conductor gaps ½-inch to 6 inches.  Arc current 
and incident energy are determined using first-order polynomials.  There are 
detailed correction factors for fuses, circuit breakers, and enclosures.  These 
formulae are significantly less sophisticated than in the 2018 revision of 1584 and 
do not have the advantage of a much-enlarged sample set. 
Stokes, Oppenlander, and Sweeting 
Stokes and Sweeting [38] continued the earlier work of Stokes and 
Oppenlander [29], performing additional arc tests on horizontally oriented bus 
rods with open ends.   The authors show that magnetic effects drive arcs in 
horizontal bus structures to yield higher levels of heat and arc plasma than in 




with-open-ends configuration directly reflects the terminal configuration often 
encountered in ground-mounted utility transformers. 
Their more recent work investigated arc plasma as a source of convective 
heat energy transmission.  In their 2003 conference paper, “Electric Arcing Burn 
Hazards”, the authors expressed concern that IEEE 1584 methods at the time 
yielded overestimates of heat for high voltage systems and alarming 
underestimates for systems under 1kV by failing to consider effects of the plasma 
cloud, particularly for horizontal buses with open ends.   
The authors’ high-speed photographs significantly reveal the behavior of 
arc flares across several milliseconds.  These photographs answer an important 
question that differentiates three-phase arcing systems from single-phase: why 
are three-phase arcs readily self-sustaining?  The answer is apparent in the arc 
images.  Stokes’ and Sweeting’s images (Figure 5, page 272) showed that 
magnetic effects influence the behavior of arc plumes drawing them closer 
together or driving them apart.  This attraction of plumes could initiate or sustain 
phase-to-phase flashover in a three-phase system and ultimately result in all 
three phases becoming fully involved.  Note in the photo sequence the back-and-
forth movement of the arc plumes between bus rod ends as the plumes develop 
and decay (images left to right, top to bottom). 
Significantly, the magnetic attraction of arc plumes is not a possibility in 
single-phase arcs, hence the authors observed that “For single-phase open-air 
arcs at a supply voltage of 415V, self-interruption always occurred in < 10 ms.”  




for a single-phase arc to achieve its highest temperatures though the emitted 
energy from less than one A.C. cycle (1/60 second) is more likely radiant than 
convective.   
Further developing the idea of very high arc flash temperatures theorized 
or observed by their predecessors, Stokes and Sweeting reported plasma cloud 
heat values (Figure 6, page 272) that could reach 14,000°C, depending on arc 
current magnitude, immediately following arc onset. 
Ironically, Doughty, Neal, and Floyd pointed toward these very results in 
their 1999 investigations, noting, “Video observation of the arcs in the box 
indicated that a significant portion of the increased incident energy was due to 
increased convective heat energy transfer due to hot gas expansion and 
projection out the front of the box toward the sensors. This effect visibly and 
dramatically increased at higher current levels.  It appeared that, as the arc 
current increased, the arc plasma volume increased and the plasma projection 
out of the box increased.” [32] However, that team immediately settled back into 
conventional wisdom and asserted that radiant emission was responsible for 
90% of arc flash heat transfer [42].  
IEEE 1584 
IEEE 1584 was originally issued in 2002 and revised for reissue in 
2018 [15].  This later version of the model and calculations is based on a 
statistical consideration of nearly 2000 experimental test runs, with equations 
derived from partial regression analysis.  These tests were performed over a 




those such as Stokes, the calculation method was expanded beyond the 2002 
models to address various conductor configurations: vertical buses inside a metal 
box, vertical buses terminated in an insulator and inside a metal box, horizontal 
buses inside a metal box, vertical in open air, and horizontal in open air.  These 
bus structures are reflected in the standard’s Electrode Configuration selections 
in section 6.6.  While Stokes’ work was not credited explicitly for influencing the 
2018 standard, both open-air arrangements address his objection to the previous 
version of the standard that asserted end-on arc flash and its attendant plasma 
cloud had not been considered and are more dangerous than conditions 
obtained normal to a vertical bus. 
The calculation method requires several steps.  The equations include 
terms for electrode configuration, system voltage, enclosure type, and arc gap.  
The initial calculation for average arcing current is the product of an exponential 
that accounts for bolted fault current and arc gap, and a 6th order polynomial with 
coefficients selected based on operating voltage and electrode configuration.  
Criticism of the previous 1584 calculation approach by Das [33] and Wilkins [35] 
noted the use of Lee’s equations for systems above 15kV, and anomalies arising 
from differing treatment of low voltage versus high voltage.  The single series of 
expressions used throughout the 2018 revision responds to those concerns. 
Once intermediate values are determined for arc current and incident 
energy, several correction factors are then applied that account for arc variation, 
enclosure size and type.  Final values are then calculated.  When system voltage 




As noted previously, paragraph 4.11 of the standard is explicitly clear, 
“This model does not cover single-phase systems.”  While identifying a 
conventional method for applying the calculations to single-phase, 4.11 also 
advises, “The incident energy result is expected to be conservative.”  
The previous version of IEEE 1584 included the assertion1 that 
“Equipment below 240V need not be considered unless it involves at least one 
125 kVA or larger low-impedance transformer in its immediate power supply.” 
[44]  However, the 2018 revision eliminated this declaration in favor of the more 
general statement, “Sustainable arcs are possible but are less likely in three-
phase systems operating at 240 V nominal or less with an available short circuit 
current below 2000A” because the exemption’s assertion was contradicted by 
subsequent testing [45, 46]. 
Smoak and Keeth 
While Smoak and Keeth’s study [40] was very limited, it explored the 
regime specifically of interest in this dissertation and makes some useful 
boundary condition observations.   
The test stand reflected a common residential single-phase service.  The 
secondary pedestal located immediately adjacent to the transformer yielded 
higher available secondary current.  The authors observed that under ordinary 
circumstances the short circuit current at a meter base or distribution panel main 
breaker would be lower due to impedance in the longer service drop length.   
 
1 The 240V/125kVA exemption was convenient for residential applications since 125kVA is a 




Two of the test runs were bolted fault and two runs were nearly bolted 
fault, using the meter base bypass handle to create a 240-volt phase-to-phase 
short circuit.  Two sizes of transformers were tested: 50kVA and 167kVA, with 
results shown in Table 2 and Table 3, starting on page 301.  The authors did not 
comment on transformer impedance or primary side characteristics such as 
available power or X/R ratio, nor did they offer theoretical bolted-fault short circuit 
current calculations.  Not considering utility characteristics is apparent in the lack 
of explanation for relatively low, and variable, levels of fault current.  While it 
could be argued this simulates real-world conditions to which utility linemen may 
be exposed, the objective of such work is most useful when consistently 
demonstrating worst-case conditions from which electrical workers must be 
protected. 
Unfortunately, Smoak and Keeth’s experimental setup did not include heat 
measurements.  They instead relied on IEEE 1584-2002, and NFPA 70E which 
in 2013 still referred to Lee’s equations and the work of Doughty and Floyd.  Both 
calculation approaches were inappropriate for predicting incident energy in most 
240-volt systems with fault currents and arc gaps in the range measured.  
Nevertheless, the authors applied Doughty’s calculation method to Test 7, the 
only one that met the applicability criteria.  Based on this single calculation, they 
asserted that expected incident energies would be “…less than 1 cal/cm2 at a 
radial distance of 18 inches from the arc.” due to the arcs usually self-




Gaps in Arc Flash Research for Single-Phase Systems 
A salient point in Wagner and Fountain’s 1948 synopsis [16] relevant to 
low-energy system arc flash is the conclusion that “On 250-volt and 125-volt a-c 
circuits, arcing faults are unstable and will extinguish themselves within two 
cycles or less even when initiated by four number 8 copper wires on a bus with 4-
inch spacing.”  While this would seem to provide very useful guidance in 
establishing a bounding condition for low-voltage arc situations, the authors go 
on to say “On buses with less than 4-inch spacing, it would be expected  that the 
arc would have more of a tendency to stabilize itself.”; an assertion they posit but 
did not test.  This lack of data overshadows the seeming utility of the 2-cycle 
apparent limit or the expectation of sustained arcs since energized conductor 
spacings of less than four inches are quite common in panelboards designed for 
240 volts or less. 
Stanback, however, did look more closely at 277-volt single-phase-to-
ground arcing conditions and determined that, for certain configurations at least, 
sustained arcing is possible.  While this work did not address the condition now 
identified as arc flash, it demonstrated practical interest in single-phase arcs in 
electrical equipment. 
IEEE 1584, as noted previously, is brief and clear.  As single-phase arc 
flash was not part of the experiment series, single-phase arcs are not supported 
by the calculations and more research is needed. 
Jones, Liggett et al. observed that “The results confirm that single-phase 




previous work by Dunki-Jacobs [19], the authors declared that the plasma 
collapse every half cycle would cause self-extinguishing.  This would be of 
primary interest to those concerned with fault propagation and arc fault 
burndown. However, the authors do not speak to the difficulty of initiating an arc 
flash in a single-phase system.  Furthermore, this declaration is contradicted to 
some extent by the work of Neal et al. in their PPE investigations [26].  
Additionally, minimal focus on the initiation of single-phase arc events was 
implicit in the work of many of Jones’ predecessors.  Laboratory methods used 
by Dunki-Jacobs, Stanback, Doughty, Floyd, Eblen, and many others were 
concerned with three-phase fault conditions because those will verifiably yield 
flash and blast.  Stokes’ and Sweeting’s later experimental configuration provided 
for exploration of single-phase arcs, but their most cited article only briefly 
mentioned results and did not draw conclusions.  Neal’s thorough treatment of 
single-phase arcs when developing PPE requirements stands out as a 
noteworthy exploration of the subject.  The test scenario Neal employed is most 
appropriate for single-phase to earth ground faults such as those a utility line 
worker might encounter but does not reflect circuit breaker panels or similar 
enclosed equipment.   
Some investigators have been curious about single-phase arc flash, 
whether at commercial distribution voltage or at utility level voltage.  However, 
the preponderance of work to date has chiefly addressed three-phase systems.  
The literature does not illuminate why single-phase arc flash seems to be 





Chapter Four :  
Literature Review - Electric Arcs  





Experimenters’ observations of electric arcs reach back to the very 
beginnings of interest in understanding electricity.  Sir Humphrey Davy’s 
development of a rudimentary arc lamp traces to the early 1800s [47].  While 
shock and burn injuries from electrical exposure were also well-understood, it 
wasn’t until the mid-20th century that physicists and medical professionals worked 
to quantify the nature of these injuries, and regulatory and standards agencies 
documented methods of protecting workers [48]. 
Physics of Fuse-Wire Initiated Arcs 
Time to Onset 
For the fine strand (133 conductor) 10 AWG copper wire used in many arc 
flash experiments, the nominal DC resistance of the wire is 1.1 ohms per 1000 ft 
and mass is 49 kg/km.  Considering an experimental setup with 1.5 inches 
between electrodes, this yields 0.1375 milli-ohms for the wire with mass 1.8669 
grams.  
Fusing current for 10 AWG wire is estimated between 333A and 1600A 
[49-51] depending on time allowed for fusing to occur, with times of one second 
up to ten seconds being traditional.  Stauffacher’s expression ([50] pp. 326) is the 
result of integrating a temperature-dependent expression for resistivity and 
specific heat of copper and, despite a dubious credit to I. M. Onderdonk, is 
mathematically valid [52] for short intervals of time.  Assuming the moment of 
failure (fusing) occurs when a copper conductor reaches melting temperature, 










× 𝑆 = log (
𝑡
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) + 1 
Where: 
I  – current (A) 
A  – conductor cross-section (cmil) 
S – time current applied (s)   
t – temperature rise of the copper conductor (°C) 
(7) 
This method suggests a 10,000-amp current should cause a 10 AWG wire 
to melt in 9.5 s. 
Babrauskas and Wichman [53] approached the problem of fusing in a 
rapid heating situation by considering the thermodynamic properties of copper: 
time to fusing is the sum of time to heat copper from ambient to melting 
temperature plus the additional time to fully melt the given mass of copper.  This 
is based on several factors including enthalpy of solid relative to 289°K, latent 
heat of melting, and temperature-dependent resistivity of copper.  The equations 
for these two phases are: 
 
𝜌𝑉[ℎ𝑠(𝑇𝑚) − ℎ𝑠(𝑇𝑜)] = 𝑡1𝑖
2𝑅 
Where: 
ρ - 8890 kg/m3 - density of copper 
V - volume of copper in m3 
hs - enthalpy of solid relative to 289K 
Tm - 1083°C 
To - given as 40°C 
t1 - time to melting temperature 
i - current in amperes 
R - average resistance of copper over the temperature range 
(8) 
 
 𝜌𝑉[∆ℎ𝑚] = 𝑡2𝑖
2𝑅(𝑇𝑚) 
Where: 
Δhm - 2.087x105 
R(Tm) - 8.927x10-8 





t2 - time to molten 
Adding these two expressions and substituting all constants yields the 
expression for rapid temperature rise fusing time: 
 𝑖2𝑡
𝐴2
= 9.644 × 104 
Where: 
A is cross-sectional area of the conductor in mm2 
(10) 
For a 10-gauge wire with cross-sectional area of 5.37mm2 and 
10,000-amp available fault current, time to fusing is calculated as 27.8 ms 
Contribution of Metallic Vapor 
While the breakdown potential of dry air is 3MV/m, this has no relevance 
to arc flash conditions.  An arc flash is initiated by a conductive object shorting 
across two or three phase legs, or one or more phase legs to ground, creating a 
momentary bolted fault.  Once the object or contact points are destroyed by the 
arc heat, a plasma is created with significant contribution by the metallic vapor.  
Babich et al. [54] conducted a series of experiments with low current arcs 
attempting to measure arc temperature, electron concentration, and spectral 
absorption for 6mm copper rods with gaps 2mm – 8mm.  They demonstrated that 
even a tiny amount of metallic vapor noticeably affects the conductivity of the 
plasma.  They also found arc temperatures as high as 8,500°C that dropped off 
rapidly as the gap between electrodes increased.  Similarly, electron 
concentration arising from metallic vapor showed a strong correlation with 




Babich’s results confirmed earlier work by Cheminat and Andanson who 
found that for low voltage and low current arcs, conductivity in the arc column 
increases by several orders of magnitude in the presence of copper vapor  as 
shown in Figure 7, page 273.  Further, Cheminat et al. [55, 56]  found that for 
arcs only in gas, conductivity was greatest near the center of the arc column.  
However, in argon arcs contaminated by copper vapor, conductivity was greatest 
at the outer reaches of the arc channel.  
Migration of the Arc 
One of the recognized behaviors of electric arcs is that they migrate away 
from the source.  This is a consequence of the Lorentz Force which is calculated 
as the cross product of the charge velocity vector and the magnetic field, as 
below in Equation (11). 
 ?⃗? = 𝑞?⃗? × ?⃗⃗? (11) 
In a system where current is flowing through two fixed, parallel conductors 
a circulating magnetic field is established perpendicular to the axis of the 
conductors according to the right-hand rule.  Since the conductors are fixed, the 
developed Lorentz force cannot push them apart.  If an arc is struck between the 
two conductors, with current flowing from Conductor 1 to Conductor 2, the arc 
becomes an independent current path that produces a separate magnetic field.  
Since the arc can move, the Lorentz force will push the arc in the direction of 





This behavior drives arcs toward and off the ends of bus bars and rods.  In 
pad-mounted transformers, the Lorentz Force causes the behavior Stokes and 
Sweeting found most alarming - the arc plume and plasma cloud projecting 
outward from the open ends of horizontal terminals.  Additionally, this behavior 
explains why calculations based on averages of Vertical Conductors in a Box 
configurations underrepresent maximum radiated heat for horizontal buses. 
Heat and Burns 
Heat Transport 
Pennes [58] study of heat transfer in human skin resulted in a time-
dependent second-order partial differential equation that can be used to 








− 𝐺(𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑏)(𝑇 − 𝑇𝑐) 
Where: 
x – skin depth (m) 
T – temperature at skin depth of interest (°C) 
ρ  – density of skin (kg/m3) 1200 (epidermis, dermis) 
c – specific heat of skin (J·kg·°C) 3598 (epidermis)  
 3222 (dermis) 
k – thermal conductivity of skin  0.255 (epidermis) 
 (W·m/°C)  0.523 (dermis) 
G – blood perfusion rate 0 (epidermis) 
 (m3/s/m3 of tissue) 0.00124 (dermis) 
ρb  – density of blood (g/l) 1050 (average) 
cb – specific heat of blood 3617 (average)  
Tc – human body core temperature 37°C 
(12) 
[59, 60] 
While Pennes studied skin thermal behavior at a nominal room 
temperature range 25°C - 27°C, with induced excursions of up to -5°C (alcohol 




Structure of Human Skin Related to Burns 
Human skin as shown in Figure 9, page 274 [61] has two major layers of 
interest: the superficial epidermis and the deeper dermis.  The epidermis is 
divided into four or five layers depending on body location.  Beneath the dermis 
is found the hypodermis or subcutaneous, consisting of connective and fatty 
tissue.  Two layers of key interest in the study of skin burns are the stratum 
basale or basal layer of the epidermis and the dermis. Second-degree burns 
result when the boundary between the basal layer and the dermis reaches 44°C.  
Third-degree burns occur when the base of the dermis reaches 44°C [59]. 
Skin layers are quite thin, depending on the body region.  Various cadaver 
studies have examined skin thickness with the results listed in Table 4, page 302 
[62] being typical for the anterior, or frontal, body surfaces that could be exposed 
to arc flash.  Note that for an adult, the combined thickness of epidermis and 
dermis on the chest or fronts of the legs is only about 1/6 inch. 
Skin Burn Classification 
There are several systems of burn classification: traditional, Zawacki and 
Reed, Lawton, and the University of Rochester and as modified by Knox.  Table 
5, page 302, compares four of these systems.  The SFPE Guide [63] asserts “No 
one method has been shown to be substantially better than the others.” and 
utilizes the traditional classification method.  Accepted criteria for second-degree 




Skin Burn Models 
The most commonly cited sources for burn injury data by prior arc flash 
investigators are publications from the late 1950s to early 1970s [25-28, 48, 63, 
64] by A.M. Stoll, M.A. Chianta, and L. Greene in collaboration with each other 
and with associates.  While the Stoll Curve is straightforward to apply, the 
authors are clear [64], and others have emphasized [59, 65], that the method is 
only appropriate for second-degree burns under circumstances closely 
duplicating the rectangular heat source and heat flux intensities [66] used in their 
experiments.  Heat flux values, times, and configurations outside those examined 
experimentally require extrapolation and may yield questionable results.  Stoll’s 
subjects coincidentally represented those most likely to be burned by arc flash, 
men and often younger men, and a region of the body most likely to be injured, 
the inner forearm.  However, extension to somewhat thicker skin on the chest 
and thighs, or to thinner skin on older workers, again requires extrapolation.       
Another method for evaluating and predicting skin burns often cited in fire 
protection studies is derived from the 1947 work of Henriques and Moritz [23] 
combined with Pennes’ equation from page 36.  The Henrique Integral is a first-
order differential of an Arrhenius temperature-dependent chemical reaction 
equation [67, 68].  The constants closely parallel those of the heat-induced 
denaturation of proteins [69], thought to be the operative process in skin damage 
due to burns.  Henrique determined skin damage begins when basal layer 




and exposure duration; and when skin temperature reaches 72°C, skin 
destruction is complete without regard for the preceding exposure time. 
 








Ω  – quantitative measure of skin damage 
P  – frequency factor 2.185 × 10124 
ΔE – activation energy of skin   
R – Universal Gas Constant 8.315 J/kmol °K 
  ΔE/R = 93534.9 
T – absolute temperature at skin layer of interest, °K 
t – total time for which T is above 44°C (317.15°K) 
(13) 
[59] 
Irreversible or second-degree burns occur when the Henrique Integral 
value Ω ≥ 1 at the basal layer of the epidermis.   
Figure 10, page 275, presents data derived from one simulation study, 
using Henrique’s method, identifying the boundary line for deep partial-thickness 
burns (burn depth to 1mm) between the time/temperature region where such 
injury will likely occur and that where it likely will not.  The vertical axis is 
temperature at the surface of the skin.  The study’s simulation interval was up to 
50 seconds.  Time in Figure 10 is less than one second, an interval appropriate 
for arc flash had this simulation study been performed with that in mind.  The 
horizontal axis for this derived plot is logarithmic rather than linear to allow 
clearer visualization of the exponential curve by not compressing the time interval 
less than six cycles (0.1 seconds). 
Arc Blast 
The phenomenon identified as arc blast arises when an electric arc heats 




cylinder.  The best-known example of this is the peal of thunder that 
accompanies a lightning bolt.  However, when a set of switch contacts opens, if 
there is a spark that produces an abrupt snap or pop sound, then even that is a 
very tiny instance of such a shock wave. 
The blast wave created by an arc flash event is significant and concerning 
for several reasons: (1) The sudden overpressure is capable of blowing covers 
off gear and otherwise destroying equipment; (2) It will propel debris away from 
the event site, including molten metal; and (3) It can cause significant injury like 
that experienced in the presence of conventional explosives including hurling 
workers and directly or indirectly causing soft or connective tissue damage. 
Hearing Damage 
A review by Babrauskas [70] collects the results of numerous arc blast 
studies considering overpressure inside enclosures.  Many are based on 
laboratory conditions inside either small volumes or quite large ones.  The most 
relevant of these studies for industrial electrical equipment2 is that of Tanaka et 
al. [71] for a 320 cm3 enclosed volume, AC current, 0.1 second arc.   
A 2-cycle arc flash event at 480 volts and 10,000 amps would, according 
to these results, yield an overpressure of approximately 110kPA.  When such 
events occur close at hand or inside an enclosed space such as a utility 
substation switchgear compartment, the pressure impulse is more than enough 
to exceed the 100kPA impulse guaranteed [72] to rupture a worker’s eardrums. 
 
2 A 200-amp 42-circuit Square D circuit breaker panel shell encloses 123 cm3.  A common size 
Motor Control Center bucket shell encloses 131 cm3, though mounted components usually 




In addition to immediate trauma, the force of an arc blast has also been 
documented as loud enough to cause inner ear damage.  This class of explosion 
injury can result in persistent tinnitus [73] or partial hearing loss. 
Blunt Force Trauma 
The boxing community has determined [74] that a punch with a force of 
3.3kN over surface area approximately 24 square inches (0.015m2) [75] poses a 
25% possibility of fracturing an average person’s ribs.  This force translates to 
220kPa or 31.9psi.  Converted to acoustic pressure, this is 201dBA.  Arc blast 
pressure values have been measured by others as high as 165dBA at six feet 
[76].  If a worker is located at the 18 inches conventionally used for incident heat 
effects calculations, the possibility of rib fractures could increase proportionally to 
the square of the reduced distance. 
Beyond the chance of directly causing broken bones, even a 165dBA 
shockwave is problematic.  Converting 165dBA to pounds per square inch yields 
0.5 psi.  Applied to the same 0.15m2 or 225 square inches of torso, this force 
yields a pressure roughly equivalent to catching a 90-pound sack of cement.  
This is more than enough to knock a startled worker completely off balance and 
into adjacent equipment, causing head injury or indirect blunt force trauma from 
impact with corners, edges, or protruding sharp objects. 
Arc Flash Light Emission 
Although light emission from an arc flash event has been examined, many 
studies lean heavily on related past work considering arc welding and flash 




that has broad frequency sensitivity, response speed, and can accurately 
measure the intensity of light yielded by a flash event. 
The Commission Internationale de l’Éclairage introduced a very precise 
determination of the human eye’s response to various frequencies of light at their 
sixth session in 1926.  The graphic representation of this luminosity function 
curve is known as the V(λ) curve.  Prior work has assumed [77] that an arc flash 
light emission measurement system should duplicate the human eye’s response, 
particularly in the photopic or well-lit region of 380nm to 760nm on the V(λ) curve; 
however, the necessity for this is not clear.  The effects on the human eye are a 
function of total light energy, and the wavelengths of interest extend into the 
UV-A (315nm – 400nm) and UV-B (280nm – 315nm) bands.  In the UV band, all 
but the longest wavelengths of UV-A are not visible to humans though emissions 
in this region are a primary source of eye injury. 
There are two areas of concern for vision damage arising from arc flash: 
the overall intensity of light across all wavelengths which will damage the retina 
and the intensity of UV light known to cause cataracts and corneal keratitis. 
Figure 11, page 275, depicts spectra for nitrogen and oxygen, the 
predominant components of air.  Figure 12, page 276, depicts a similar plot for 
several metals common in electrical systems [78].  Both charts range from UV-B 
through visible wavelengths.   
Copper is the material of choice in most facility electrical wire.  Tin-plated 
copper is prevalent in electrical equipment such as switchgear, panelboards, and 




wiring, and a frequent choice for transformer windings.  Iron appears in the steel 
from which electrical workers’ tools are constructed. 
Nitrogen and oxygen have generally low spectral emission intensities 
although oxygen shows stronger emissions in the region of shorter visible 
wavelengths and extending into UV.  Copper has strong spectral lines in both 
visible and UV-A wavelengths.  Spectral lines from tin in the wavelengths of 
interest are most strong in UV-B.  Aluminum shows strong spectral emissions in 
UV-B, UV-A, and visible.  Iron emissions are all strongest around the UV-A band. 
The major contributors to ultraviolet emissions from arc flash events are 
the metals involved, i.e., the current-carrying conductors which are copper, tin-
plated copper, or aluminum; and steel tools.  Visible light emissions are 
dominated by copper, aluminum, and oxygen. 
Vision Damage 
An arc flash event develops within the first few cycles (16ms – 48ms).  
Even caffeinated college students have an eye-blink delay of as much as 44ms 
[79] so it seems probable that vision damage from an arc flash event will, like 
heat incident on the skin, depend on the total intensity of light and the energy in 
particular bands such as UV and not be affected by protective reflexes.  The 
human blink reflex is simply not fast enough to protect the eyes from arc flash. 
Ultraviolet keratitis has been compared to sunburn of the cornea and 
conjunctiva [80].  Even single exposures to intense UV-A and UV-B will cause 
ultraviolet keratitis and can be powerful enough to result in cataracts [73].  




Experimental work by Shiuan-Hau Rau et al. [81] has shown that three-
phase arc flash events can produce on the order of 3 x 106 lux at 3m from an 
event.  They have proposed a predictive model for light intensity based on these 
results.  The calculations for this proposed method are shown in Equation (14). 
 
𝑏𝑥𝑐𝑓 = 𝐾1 × 𝑒(𝐾2×𝑏𝑜𝑥 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
Lux = 𝑏𝑥𝑐𝑓 × 10(𝐾3+𝐾4×log(𝐼𝑏𝑓)+𝐾5×log(𝐺𝑎𝑝)+𝐾6×log(𝐷)) 
Where: 
Ibf  – Bolted Fault or Available fault current (kA) 
Gap  – electrode separation (mm) 
box size – average of height and width in inches 
K1 – K6 – constants based on system voltage and configuration 
(14) 
Consider a sample enclosure 14.75 inches x 12 inches with open-ended 
electrodes (VCB) separated 1.5 inches; 10,000A available fault current; and a 
working distance of 18 inches.  Using this method yields an overall expected light 
intensity as follows: 
 
𝑏𝑥𝑐𝑓 = 0.0939 × 𝑒(0.0896×13.375) 
Lux
= 3.113 × 10(22.472+0.35 log(10000)+0.384 log(38)−4.935 log(457)) 
 
Calculated light intensity is 7x1011 lux for a three-phase 10,000-amp flash 
in this case.  Past work on eye sensitivity and injuries arising from bright light lists 
6.83 x 106 lux for 100ms as bright enough to cause retinal damage.  The 
calculation Shiuan-Hau Rau et al. have offered suggests a worker standing at a 
conventional 18 inch working distance from industrial three-phase equipment 
could be exposed to a flash as much as five orders of magnitude brighter than 





Chapter Five :  






Reported statistics on arc flash injuries vary depending on the authority 
consulted.  In any given year, there are between 5 and 10 [82] arc flash incidents 
per day to as many as 30,000 per year [83]; with 7000 burn injuries; 2000 
hospitalizations [48]; and 400 fatalities [84].  The most severe of these 
circumstances may be underestimated since incidents may not be reported [85] 
by OSHA as arc flash if there was not a fatality; fewer than three employees 
required hospitalization; OSHA did not perform an investigation; or the event was 
reported as another incident type such as electrocution, a fall, or a fire [86].   
It is clear from examining case histories of arc flash injuries, fatalities, and 
losses that these incidents are usually preventable.  Injury and fatality events 
often result from a general deficiency in an organization’s safety culture.  These 
deficiencies manifest as lack of knowledge, lack of training, and lack of emphasis 





Case: Chew et al. v. American Greetings Corp. 
Courts: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 
Jonesboro Division [87] 
CASE NO. 3:10CV00199 March 5, 2013  
 United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit  [88] 
754 F.3d 632 (2014)   
Nos. 13-1966, 13-1751  Submitted January 13, 2014 
Facts of the case: 
 
On Sept 23, 2009, an employee of American Greetings reported a burned 
electrical cable and a blown fuse between the utility pole and a facility 
transformer.  This was brought to the attention of the Plant Maintenance 
Manager and the local electric utility was called. 
The facility’s ground-mounted transformer was equipped with two sets of doors- 
an exterior weather door and a flash-guard barrier inner door.  Both sets of doors 
were opened in the presence of the utility manager.  The transformer nameplate 
was affixed to the inside of the exterior door initially visible but then obscured 
after both doors were opened. The transformer nameplate identified the primary 
voltage as 13,800 volts and the secondary voltage as 4,160 volts.  The 
transformer did not bear exterior labeling at the time of the incident. 
The utility manager directed one of the plaintiffs to retrieve a voltmeter to take 
measurements at the transformer.  The plaintiff returned with a voltmeter rated 
for 1000 volts because he had not looked at the nameplate and believed the 
transformer had a 480-volt secondary.   
When the plaintiffs approached the energized transformer to use the voltmeter, 
an arc flash ensued that injured plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff Duncan, the crew supervisor and the one most injured, had more than 
23 years of training and experience. 




Plaintiff Hoskins was an apprentice lineman. 
Court opinion: 
The District Court agreed with American Greetings Corp’s response that it owed 
Plaintiffs no duty to warn of special hazards since they were experienced 
electrical contractors and should have known the dangers of electricity and risk 
of arc flash. 
In summary judgement, based on undisputed material facts, District Court found 
in favor of Defendant.   
This decision was upheld on Appeal. 
Analysis of the case: 
The plaintiffs did not read the transformer nameplate nor did they perform a Pre-
Job Hazard Analysis.   
One of the plaintiffs had worked at the American Greetings many times, was 
accustomed to power distribution at 480 volts, and assumed this was again the 
case.  None of the plaintiffs had ever worked on a pad-mounted transformer with 
secondary rated 4,160 volts. 
The investigating forensic engineer [89] observed that the site was supplied by 
seven (7) pad-mounted transformers: five with secondary voltage 480 volts, two 
parallel with secondary voltage 4,160 volts.  The engineer commented that the 
4,160-volt transformer to be tested was not in compliance with NFPA 70 Article 
450.8(D) that requires voltage labeling when live parts are exposed.  This 
observation may have been misplaced since secondary terminals were not at 
risk of being exposed until the weather door was open, thereby revealing the 
transformer’s nameplate. 
The 1000 volt rated voltmeter selected would have been appropriate for 
assumed conditions; however, it was entirely unsuited for actual conditions.  




instantly and catastrophically when connected to the much higher system 
voltage. 
No comments were offered in court documents concerning plaintiffs donning 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).  However, it seems highly unlikely they 
did so since PPE selection would have been the result of a Job Hazard Analysis 
including reading the transformer labeling or system knowledge provided by the 
facility owner’s representative who was on hand.  The absence of PPE would 
have contributed to significant injury from the resulting arc flash. 
While the extents of the crew members’ injuries were not discussed in case files, 
none were identified as deceased.  However, the crew supervisor’s spouse was 
named as a co-plaintiff, suggesting he was most severely affected; possibly 
disabled.  This is supported by the forensic engineer’s mentioning that only this 
individual as having been burned. 
Conclusions: 
The proximate cause of the arc flash and injuries in this case was the plaintiffs’ 
failure to be guided by their experience and determine actual conditions before 
beginning work.  Rather than consult with the system owner or investigate the 
equipment to be worked, the senior lineman made a flawed assumption that 
precipitated an arc flash event at one of the most dangerous of all possible 




Case: Khosh vs. Staples Construction Inc. 
Courts: Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate 
District, Division Six.  2d Civil No. B268937  Filed: 10/26/16 [90]  
Facts of the case: 
Plaintiff Khosh was an employee of Myers Power Systems, a subcontractor of 
DK Electrical Systems, working under contract to Staples Construction.  Staples 
had been contracted by California State University Channel Islands to install a 
backup power system.  This installation required construction in, and 
modifications to, a utility substation.  Myers Power was hired to construct and 
install switchgear. 
In preparation for completion of the installation, Myers Power advised they would 
need three days to complete their installation work.  A campus-wide electrical 
shutdown was scheduled so Myers could have the required time to perform its 
last task. 
Khosh arrived on-site 2-1/2 hours ahead of the scheduled shutdown.  The 
University’s project manager allowed Khosh and a helper to enter the substation. 
Khosh performed work on energized equipment.  An arc flash ensued 30 
minutes before the scheduled outage and Khosh was seriously injured. 
Court opinion: 
Even though Staples Construction had a contractual requirement from the 
University to be responsible for worksite safety, the court found for the Defendant 
because Staples Construction did not participate in the substation construction, 
and did not have a representative on-site when Khosh was injured. [91] 
Analysis of the case: 
The nature of the final installation activities was well-understood.  Myers Power 
had communicated their requirements through Staples to the University.  The 




Scheduling such work is a large undertaking.  It would have required a work 
plan, including coordination with the electric utility, to perform the Lockout-Tagout 
at the substation. 
Conclusions: 
Khosh deviated significantly from the planned schedule by arriving on-site far in 
advance of the agreed time.   
Khosh further deviated from accepted work practice by unnecessarily interacting 
with energized equipment in a utility substation when there was no reason to do 
so. An outage had already been arranged, three days were planned, and the 




Case: Gerasi v. Gilbane Building Co. 
Courts: Cook County Circuit Court No. 08-L-7258 
 Illinois Appellate Court, First District, Second Division  
No. 1-13-3000  Filed: 05/14/2017 [92] 
Facts of the case: 
Gilbane was contracted by AT&T to replace air conditioning equipment at a 
Chicago facility.  This was not the first time Gilbane had done work for this client 
in this facility.  Gilbane hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work.  Gilbane 
had a standing relationship with this subcontractor, who had performed electrical 
work at that facility for many years. 
Detailed plans were prepared for each phase of work both to maintain service 
continuity and to ensure worker and facility safety. 
The electrical subcontractor was responsible for reporting any equipment they 
identified as requiring de-energize and lockout/tagout before performing work.  
The electrical subcontractor had not identified any equipment believed to need 
deactivation before work could begin, nor did they have in place any detailed 
work plans for performing temporary equipment connections. 
The electrical subcontractor was charged with providing personal protective 
equipment (PPE).  Such equipment was provided and stored in a designated 
location.  Any worker needing PPE was free to use it. 
Throughout the course of the contract, several temporary electrical power feeds 
were required to supply the subcontractor’s equipment and tools.  These 
temporary connections were made at an existing Motor Control Center (MCC).  
AT&T had specifically prohibited pulling MCC buckets while the entire MCC was 
energized.  While the electrical subcontractor could deactivate and connect 
spare MCC breakers, only the building manager was permitted to authorize 




At the time of the incident, one member of the electrical subcontractor's team 
was connecting a temporary power feed to a deactivated bucket when he was 
called away.  Plaintiff continued the connection activity.  Plaintiff was not wearing 
any electrical PPE, and the plaintiff’s co-workers were also not in the habit of 
wearing PPE for work inside deactivated buckets.   
Plaintiff encountered a difficulty tightening one breaker connection, gripped the 
breaker with one hand while tightening with the other, and the breaker failed 
internally causing an arc flash that injured the plaintiff seriously. 
Court opinion: 
Summary judgement was granted because there was no dispute about material 
facts.  Gilbane was not required to, and did not, have a full-time Safety 
Supervisor on site to oversee all subcontractors’ activities.  Each subcontractor 
was required to provide and adhere to a rigorous safety plan. 
The trial court found in favor of Defendant Gilbane – they were not materially 
responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries.  This finding was upheld on appeal. 
Analysis of the case: 
Arc flash was first introduced into NFPA 70E in 1995.  Guidance evolved and 
matured with each successive revision to the document.  Electricians in the mid-
2000s should have been familiar with 70E including the specifics of Approach 
Boundaries and associated PPE. 
It was noted that neither the Plaintiff nor his co-workers were in the habit of 
wearing electrical PPE while working inside a deactivated Motor Control Center 
bucket even though the line side of the bucket breaker was still energized.  This 
is a common behavior among old-line electricians who either do not understand 
or choose to ignore arc flash hazards. 
NFPA 70E identifies the Restricted Approach Boundary for exposed components 
energized to 480 volts to be 12 inches.  Inside this boundary, an electrical worker 




Permit.  Outside this boundary, to a distance usually 42 inches from the exposed 
equipment, a worker must be guided by an Electrical Job Hazard Analysis which 
will include required PPE.   
The electrical sub-contractor did not have any detailed work plans for temporary 
connections, no mention was made of Electrical Job Hazard Analysis 
documents, and it was specifically noted that Plaintiff was not wearing PPE.  
Working inside a de-activated Motor Control Center bucket will occur outside the 
12" boundary if in the bottom right corner, or inside the 12" boundary if on the 
breaker itself.  Plaintiff was working inside the 12" boundary.   
Conclusions: 
As evidenced by the explicit declaration that they had been performing such 
work, in the same way, for years without incident, the cause of this incident was 
a pronounced safety culture deficiency within the entire electrical subcontractor 
team. This dangerous work practice would have repeatedly exposed members of 
the team and those working in the immediate vicinity to unnecessary risk of 
severe arc flash injury. 
While the best circumstance is to perform electrical work on completely de-
energized systems, it is possible for well-trained and experienced electricians to 
safely conduct work near active equipment.  It was possible that even if the work 
had been done with the entire MCC turned off, the failed circuit breaker could still 
have exploded when connected and re-energized.  However, with the door of the 
energized bucket open, and no PPE, the plaintiff had no barriers between him 




Case: Arc Flash Accident - LANL TA-53  
Facility: Los Alamos National Lab, Technical Area 53 Substation 0070 
Facts of the case: 
Early May 2015, maintenance workers were simultaneously executing two 
separate work orders to perform Preventive Maintenance (PM) on switchgear 
and air-break circuit breakers in the TA-53-0070 13,800-volt substation. 
The maintenance crew consisted of members with various levels of experience, 
with one member available to perform zero-voltage checks and to attach 
grounding cables (a utility work convention). 
Maintenance and cleaning activities were completed on two of three 
compartments on the first day of work.  These compartments were re-energized 
to restore power to parts of the facility.  Appropriate markings were put in place 
to identify the boundary between de-energized and energized compartments. 
Workers returned the next day to resume.  A pre-job briefing was conducted 
including a detailed review of hazards and personnel safety requirements.  The 
energized compartments were specifically called out, tags confirmed to be in 
place, and grounding cables still secure.  Work commenced. 
At the time of the incident, the worker, designated W1 in the report [93], walked 
past tags and entered one of the energized compartments.  W1 was wearing 
nitrile gloves, an arc-rated long-sleeve shirt with sleeves rolled up, non-arc-rated 
coveralls, and a baseball cap.  W1 removed the protective covers from the bus 
bars and then commenced a cleaning operation, spraying commercial cleaner 
into the space between the bus bars energized at 13,800 volts.  An arc flash 
ensued that ignited W1’s clothing.  The pressure wave from the arc blast ejected 
W1 from the compartment and threw him to the floor.  W1’s co-workers 
extinguished the burning garments, summoned assistance, and was evacuated 
W1 in critical condition to the regional burn center. Forensic analysis of W1’s  




Investigating team’s analysis and determinations: 
The Investigating Team considered three primary topic areas: 1) past experience 
guiding the work at hand, 2) safety management, work planning and control, and 
3) human performance.   
Past experience was recognized.  Subject matter experts were consulted to 
correctly identify the scope and complexity of the PM tasks.  However, work 
tasks for substation PMs had historically been described in broad terms and not 
down to the specific task level.  As a result, hazards of working in the substation 
were not fully identified. 
Work scope description was deficient. Planning failed to account for performing 
two PM activities at the same time, workplace clutter and crowding, changing the 
work area configuration in the middle of the job, and the possibility of human 
error.  The pre-job brief on the second morning did not anticipate the possibility 
of a worker entering an energized compartment. 
Enforcement of personnel protection was lacking.  PM work packages required 
hard hat, safety glasses, arc-rated long sleeve shirt, and leather gloves.  W1 was 
allowed to work in nitrile gloves and roll up shirt sleeves.  Zero voltage checks 
were not performed in the compartment W1 was working: there was no physical 
barrier installed to block access to the energized buses. 
The work evolution was scheduled across a weekend with workers putting in as 
much as 28 hours of overtime on top of the previous 40-hour workweek.  Human 
Performance and prevention of fatigue-induced errors were not adequately 
addressed with detailed work package steps.  The method of identifying work 






The proximate cause of W1’s injuries was his walking past identifying tags; 
entering a substation compartment energized at 13,800 volts; removing covers 
and spraying conductive cleaner into the exposed buses causing an arc flash 
and blast. 
The investigating team determined that the root cause factors were failing to 
rigorously implement zero-voltage checks before every work step and failing to 
implement physical barriers around energized equipment. 
The stress, fatigue, crowded conditions, clutter, and sense of urgency to 
complete the work evolution and outage over a weekend were also factors.  
Under these circumstances, it would have been easy to make or allow poor 
choices.   
Additionally, changing the configuration of the substation by re-energizing part of 
it amid the workflow may have been desirable and viewed as an accommodation 






Case: Electrical Arc Injury - Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 
Facility: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Menlo Park, CA 
Facts of the case: 
Bay Span was an electrical maintenance firm providing construction and labor 
services to SLAC and other northern California industrial companies.  On the 
morning of October 11, 2004, a SLAC supervisor instructed a Bay Span 
electrician, designated BSE-1 in the incident report, to install a new circuit 
breaker in an existing panel.  The panel was 480-volt and energized. 
BSE-1 was wearing a cotton/polyester shirt with short sleeves, electrical gloves, 
safety glasses, and a hard hat.  None of BSE-1’s garments were arc flash rated.  
He was using a standard, uninsulated screwdriver.  BSE-1 was kneeling on a 
rubber insulating mat at the time of the incident. 
The SLAC supervisory provided the new circuit breaker.  The breaker and panel 
were manufactured by General Electric.  The breaker was mechanically mounted 
by screws at the load-lug end of the breaker and electrically connected by bolts 
through wells on the supply side of the breaker into threaded holes in the bus 
bars.  The panel bus bars were constructed: they were fully exposed when the 
dead-front panel cover was removed. 
Starting with the electrical connection, BSE-1 attempted to mount the breaker.  
Phase C (bottom) was secured and then Phase B (middle).  BSE-1 was trying to 
secure the Phase A screw (top) when the arc flash occurred. 
Based on photographs and forensic analysis of the burned bus bars, the 
investigating team determined that BSE-1 was struggling to tighten the Phase A 
bus screw.  There are several possible explanations - thread damage to the bolt 
or bus bar hole, or misalignment.  When BSE-1 applied additional force with the 
screwdriver to the bolt, it compressed insulating material between Phase A and 




BSE-1 was burned third-degree on his face, chest, and legs; and second-degree 
on his arms.  This involved about half of his body surface.  The attending laborer 
was knocked off his feet by the force of the pressure wave, resulting in soreness 
in his back but was otherwise he was uninjured. [95] 
Investigating team’s analysis and determinations: 
The investigating team identified several key work execution and worker safety 
deficiencies. 
Neither Bay Span nor SLAC had conducted a Pre-Work Hazard Analysis, nor 
had they prepared an Energized Equipment Work Permit identifying appropriate 
PPE.  There was no identified justification for why the work was conducted on an 
energized panel rather than waiting for a convenient time when it could be de-
energized. 
BSE-1 failed to stop work when unexpected difficulties arose.  None of the Bay 
Span personnel working in the area exercised their authority to stop work in the 
face of hazardous conditions.   
Violating OSHA’s standards for worker protection in multi-employer workplaces, 
SLAC’s provisions for worker safety only covered SLAC employees not 
contractors.   
There was a complete breakdown of responsibility in the worker oversight chain.  
The SLAC supervisor failed to conduct a pre-job brief and advise BSE-1 of the 
hazards and failed to insist on appropriate PPE. Bay Span’s oversight failed to 
identify and correct BSE-1’s marked nonconformity with its contractual safety 
requirements.  SLAC’s electrical safety oversight did not detect and correct 
organizational and contractor failures.  DOE’s safety office did not identify and 
issue corrective requirements for SLAC’s failure to provide uniform safety 
protections as required by OSHA.  All organizations involved with planning the 






As in Gerasi v. Gilbane, there was no defensible reason why the Bay Span 
electrician was working inside the Restricted Boundary in an energized 480-volt 
3-phase panel without arc flash rated PPE.  
This worker was woefully unprepared for the work environment.  He should have 
been wearing a full complement of PPE including 8 cal/cm2 rated coveralls over 
cotton garments, a rated face shield and hood with safety glasses and hard hat, 
gloves, boots, and hearing protection. 
Systemic failures in safety culture extended from Department of Energy 
oversight down to contract workers.  The Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 
management team had abrogated their direct safety supervision responsibility by 
failing to treat contract personnel with the same care as SLAC employees.  This 
failure in leadership unintentionally influenced front line workers’ behavior and 
manifested as both ignoring safety requirements and workers’ failing to look out 





Case: Arc Flash - PM of Vacuum Circuit Breakers 
Facility: Idaho National Laboratory, Central Facilities Area (CFA) 
Substation 
Facts of the case: 
During the fourth week of April 2015, three Idaho National Lab linemen were 
performing preventive maintenance on vacuum breakers.  The equipment being 
worked on was connected to a 12,500-volt bus.   
During work on the final breaker, one of the linemen attempted to move a 
grounding cable from Phase A of the breaker to another phase.  The cable 
became hung on a corner of the vacuum breaker cabinet.  The worker was 
handling the ground cable with an insulated lineman’s hot stick.  He attempted to 
dislodge the cable several times by flipping it, eventually succeeding but 
unintentionally causing the cable to rise and contact an energized, overhead 
cable above an adjacent breaker.  The free end of the grounding cable 
contacting the energized overhead cable caused an arc flash.   
No one was injured and there was no reportable damage to equipment or loss of 
power.  [96] 
Investigating team’s analysis and determinations: 
Work package planning failed to develop any mitigations for possible hazards 
associated with the energized overhead cables even though they were 
specifically called out: minimum separation distance was clearly identified. 
The hazard of working close to energized equipment was discussed during the 
pre-job brief; however, workers did not request additional hazard controls.  
Additionally, they were overly focused on keeping power on and accepted 
increased risk to achieve this. 
The lineman performing the grounding cable relocation lost overall situational 




cable.  The lineman acting as designated spotter failed to remain vigilant and 
ensure minimum separation distance was maintained. 
Conclusions: 
While this incident did not result in worker injury, power outage, or facility 
damage, it easily could have.  Splatter from the arc flash could have caused 
serious burns.  A severe arc event could have severed the overhead cable. 
Lineman’s grounding cables are commonly between 6' and 10' long.  That a free 
end could contact an overhead cable suggests work was being conducted inside 
the recommended 10-foot separation from 12.5 kV lines.  It would have been 
prudent, and not difficult, for the linemen to have set conventional insulating line 




Case: Arc Flash - Locked Out 3.3-kV Fused Contactor 
Facility: Hot Rolling Steel Mill 
Facts of the case: 
On 19 May 2014, a 3300-volt fused contactor had been disengaged (racked out) 
of associated switchgear to support planned maintenance of the supplied 
equipment, a water pump.  Maintenance activities had concluded. The facility 
was being returned to service. 
The contactor cubicle was designed so that when racked out, the internal 
electrical components were rotated to disengage with switchgear buses and 
press fuse phase terminals against grounding straps. 
When the water pump was wanted, a member of the plant staff removed the 
padlock from the contactor cubicle’s racking handle and attempted to re-engage 
the contactor cubicle in the switchgear.  The cubicle did correctly re-engage; 
therefore, the worker reapplied the padlock and reported the issue. 
After making observations in the plant control room, the staff member returned 
later with senior workers including a senior electrician.  With the two other staff 
members attending, the senior electrician opened the front of the cubicle to 
inspect.  The electrician observed a broken pin in the racking mechanism and 
discussed that finding with attending staff while still kneeling in front of the open 
gear cubicle.   
During the discussion, while the electrician was facing the cubicle, an arc flash 
occurred that severely injured the senior electrician. 
At the time of the incident, all staff members were wearing company-issued 
cotton jackets and trousers, personal shirts, safety glasses, leather safety shoes, 
and hard hats. 
Maintenance workers lacked manufacturer’s support documentation for the 




grounding straps.  This resulted in the grounding straps potentially contacting 
fuse phase terminals during both rack-in and rack-out operations. 
At the time of the incident, the phase terminals were still engaged with the 
grounding straps and the broken mechanical linkage allowed the contactor’s 
terminals to fall into and re-engage with the switchgear bus bars. 
Investigating team’s analysis and determinations: 
The investigating team determined the arc flash was comprised of two events.  
The first occurred when the contactor cubicles phase terminals neared the 
switchgear bus bars.  This arc was extinguished when the terminals made solid 
contact with the bus bars.  A second and much more powerful arc flash then 
occurred where the cubicle fuses phase terminals contacted the grounding 
straps.  This arc flash vaporized the grounding straps. 
The staff member who removed the contactor cubicle and attempted to re-
engage it erred when reapplying the padlock.  At that point, an unknown 
condition existed and the presence of the padlock unintentionally communicated 
a safe condition.  A new and separate work activity should have been initiated to 
troubleshoot the malfunctioning cubicle. 
The senior electrician assumed the safe state of the contactor cubicle and 
opened the front cover.  He compounded this error by failing to don electrical 
PPE.  The investigating team identified an organizational safety culture 
deficiency that resulted in failures to correctly identify and respond to potential 
workplace hazards. 
Maintenance personnel were not provided proper manufacturer documentation 
or detailed work instructions describing correct adjustments to the contactor 
cubicle’s internal grounding straps.  As a result, these straps were forced into the 
wrong positions over time and created the possibility of a short-circuit which, in 




Maintenance personnel had grown complacent about the condition of the 
compartment’s mechanical linkage.  The linkage failure observed had occurred 
on previous occasions.  The failed component had been replaced but never 
reported. 
Conclusions: 
While the staff member who originally attempted to return the contactor to 
service is to be commended for stopping work in the face of uncertainty, his 
choice to reapply the padlock unintentionally communicated a safe condition that 
did not exist.  A better choice might have been leaving the lock off and setting up 
cones and warning tape. 
The senior electrician failed to exhibit a questioning attitude when confronted 
with an unknown condition and then compounded that error by assuming a safe 
state rather than starting with the assumption of greatest danger until proven 
otherwise.  He paid for this lack of judgment with 24 months away from work. 
Organizational lack of support and complacence, coupled with a likely emphasis 
on getting it done quickly, led to the mechanics and technicians causing damage 
to the cubicle assembly and putting it outside the manufacturer’s safe operating 
envelope. 
Safety culture deficiencies were also apparent from the normal sequence of 
events that allowed a staff member who was not an electrically qualified person 
to perform a cubicle rack in operation on 3300-volt switchgear.  This is 
considered by some to be energized work.  As such, it would require an 
Energized Equipment Work Permit with attendant hazard analysis and 







Chapter Six :  





Exploring some of the assertions about arc flash in single-phase systems 
invited experimental investigation.  Conventional wisdom, as embodied in the 
2002 release of IEEE 1584, stated that 240-volt single-phase systems with 
available energy below some threshold did not yield risk for arc flash and thus did 
not require analysis.  However, lacking supporting data, this assertion was 
removed.  With this as a starting point, the initial hypothesis for this series of 
tests was “Single-phase arc flash energy yield is expected to be less than 
that predicted for three-phase at equivalent voltage and available current.”  
Thus, a conventional test article and calorimeter configuration was deemed 
appropriate.   
This experimental series sought to focus directly on installations found in 
residential, commercial, and light industrial applications.  In these types of 
facilities, single-phase power distribution is common.   
Terminology 
Definition of terms used in this section: 
• Cycle.  This test series used 60 Hz alternating current prevalent in the 
United States.  One cycle is defined as 1/60 second or 16.67ms for a full 
360-degree sine wave. 
• Available Fault Current.  The maximum short-circuit current that the test 
cell can deliver to the fixture, based on its configuration.  This was 
determined by the arrangement of resistors and inductors in a network 
ahead of the cell’s step-down transformer.  The Schneider one-line 




• Open Circuit Voltage (Voc).  The nominal secondary voltage delivered to 
the test cell, based on its configuration.  This is determined by the 
arrangement of primary side resistors and inductors, and the position of 
the transformer primary taps. 
• Arc Flash.  The intense light and heat radiated by an arcing fault.  This is 
separate from arc blast, the supersonic shockwave that often arises from 
the same fault that produces arc flash. 
• Arc Blast.  The pressure wave created by the rapid expansion of the 
plasma column and surrounding air during an arc flash event. 
The combination of direct connection to the public utility and a very large 
step-down transformer yielded what is referred to as a stiff system; that is: the 
test cell could deliver very high currents without exhibiting appreciable sag in 
delivered voltage.  The fault currents chosen for this series of tests were low 
enough that no secondary voltage sag was expected. 
Test Fixture 
The conventional test article for IEEE arc flash experiments aka arc in a 
box consists of parallel copper rods mounted at the rear of a 20 x 20 x 20 inch 
steel box, open on one side.  Rods may extend down to insulating material at the 
bottom of the enclosure yielding a Vertical Conductors in a Box with Barrier 
(VCBB) configuration or they may end in open air yielding the more common 
Vertical Conductors in a Box (VCB) configuration (Figure 14, page 278).  These 




and others [27] and saw continued use through 2014 in data collection for the 
latest edition of IEEE 1584.   
While the single-phase arrangement used by Neal [42, 97] (Figure 15, 
page 278) is still employed for ASTM fire retardant clothing testing, it does not 
represent the Vertical Conductors in a Box (VCB) conditions found inside a circuit 
breaker panel or contactor enclosure. 
For this reason, a variant of the IEEE configuration was used for this 
investigation: a smaller enclosure with two parallel electrodes as shown in Figure 
16, page 279.  The shell is 14.75 inches high, 12 inches wide, and 7.5 inches 
deep.  Electrodes are 3/4-inch diameter, separated by a nominal 1-1/2-inch gap 
braced by four phenolic blocks as shown.  Vertical position is maintained by set 
screws in each support block.  Connections at the top are made with rod clamps.  
Sensors 
Calorimeters 
The facility provided the copper slug calorimeters used for this test series. 
These are the same type of thermal capacitance sensors commonly employed in 
arc flash and ASTM 1959 clothing testing for the last 20 years - an 18g electrical 
grade copper disk, 4cm in diameter, with a Type J thermocouple spot-welded to 
the back.  The assembly is mounted in an insulating carrier, in this case ceramic-
based, and supported on a structural arm.  See Figure 17, page 279, for 
arrangement and Figure 18, page 280, for a simplified cross section.  The 
composition of the support arm, conductive or non-conductive, does not influence 




Arrangement of the calorimeters bounds a hexagonal region 15 inches 
wide and 15 inches tall.  This area approximates that of the front center of an 
adult torso from chin to navel [98]. 
The rated temperature range for Type J (iron / copper-nickel) 
thermocouples is 0°C to 750°C with a commonly published upper limit of 1190°C.  
Other experimenters investigating catastrophic high energy arc faults [14] have 
employed Type K thermocouples (nickel-chromium / nickel-aluminum), with 
range up to 1250°C, bonded to Inconel® slugs, to improve sensor survival and 
response time.   
Calorimeters and the ambient temperature probe were connected to a 
standalone HBM Genesis 3i High-Speed Data Recorder.  This unit provided the 
required electrical isolation noted by Zhang [99]. 
Voltage and Current 
Phase current to the test fixture was measured with Rogowski coil 
transducers.  Ground current (fixture shell to earth ground) was measured with a 
current transformer (CT) during the first group of 43 tests.  The maximum 
secondary voltage attainable in the Number 3 test cell is 726 volts RMS so bus 
voltage was measured by direct connection through 100-to-1 high-impedance 
test probes.  Current and voltage measurements were fed directly to an HBM 
data acquisition system Genesis 3t unit connected to the test cell control station.  
Since this test series used one phase pair of the source, only one phase voltage 






The author provided a PCB Piezotronics 102B04 high frequency ICP® 
dynamic pressure sensor for test series #2.  This type of device measures 
impulses to 1000 psi and has a response time ≤ 1 millisecond.  The pressure 
sensor was connected to a 482C four channel signal conditioner provided by the 
lab.  Signal conditioner output was connected as an input to the HBM data 
acquisition system Genesis 3t.  Pressure values are reported as the third channel 
on oscillograms for series #2 tests 1 through 110. 
The blast pressure sensor was mounted 18 inches above the midline of 
the center-middle calorimeter to approximate the position of a worker’s ears.  A 
support arm was constructed from the same extruded aluminum members as the 
calorimeter frame, with an angle bracket drilled and tapped to accept the 
sensor’s threaded front end.  A curtain of rubber sheet was hung below the 
sensor to protect the cable from flash spray and the plasma cloud.  See Figure 
19 on page 280. 
Test Cell Configuration 
Initial configuration for the test cell had the calorimeters spaced a 
conventional 18 inches back from the near surfaces of the vertical bus rods.  A 
high-speed digital video camera was located approximately ten feet away, behind 
a debris screen as shown in Figure 20, page 281.  Two of three available phases 
sourced power via 750kcmil cables, restrained with rope to prevent movement 




An arc between the electrode rods was initiated with a piece of 10AWG 
bare fine-stranded, tinned copper fuse wire tied to secure by friction onto each 
rod as shown in Figure 21, page 281.  The fuse wire was typically located 
between 1/2 inch and 1-1/2 inches above the ends of the rods.   
The rods were cleaned with Scotch-Brite™ between test runs to remove 
oxidation and maintain uniform conductivity.  When wire remnants were welded 
to the electrodes by a test, these were removed with a small flat file. 
Test Scenarios 
Four nominal test scenarios were planned for the first test series that 
reflect standard breaker panel voltages and low to medium fault currents: two 
groups at 240 volts and two at 480 volts.  Considering past investigators’ 
observations that arc events can be erratic, each test scenario included 10 runs 
at the selected voltage and fault current to secure a reasonable minimum number 
of samples for statistical treatment. 
Scenarios for the second test series were chosen to fill in the gaps 
between 240 volts and 600 volts, to investigate the validity of using simple 
geometry for correcting data collected with calorimeters at 12 inches, and to 
determine whether painting calorimeter surfaces flat black would affect measured 
heat.  Selected scenarios were based on available test cell configurations.  
Adjustments to Configuration 
The first test run in the 240V @ 10kA configuration produced almost no 




inches to 12 inches for the remainder of the first test series in the interest of 
intercepting more radiated energy as shown in Figure 22, page 282.  This closer 
configuration was also used for selected runs in the second test series. 
Two sound pressure measurements were attempted at the beginning of 
the first 480-volt test group.  A handheld sound pressure meter was secured just 
to the left of the test fixture as shown in Figure 23, page 282.  This location was 
chosen to approximate an electrical worker’s position and simulate sound 
pressure to which they might be exposed.  In both cases, the developed sound 
pressure exceeded the device’s 130dB upper limit.  In the interest of avoiding 
damage to the instrument, no additional measurements were attempted during 
the remaining 28 tests in this series.  A high-pressure blast sensor was added to 










Test Run Numbers & Configurations 
Raw data files for voltage, current, pressures; calorimeter measurements; 
oscillograms; high-speed camera sequences; and calculation spreadsheets are 
included with this dissertation as file attachments.  Measurement and video files 
are identified by oscillogram number.  Test run identifiers and configurations are 
listed in Table 6 through Table 9, beginning on page 303. 
Analysis of Measured Currents 
Figure 24, page 283, shows probability distribution histograms of 
measured current values for series #1 test runs 2 through 11 and test runs 12 
through 21.  Test run 1 values are calculated but not used initially because the 
calorimeters were spaced 18 inches; all other series #1 runs were at 12 inches.  
Figure 25, page 283, shows probability distribution histograms of measured 
current values for test runs 22 through 31 and test runs 32 through 41. Series #1 
test runs 42 and 43 are not used here because they were performed for video 
capture only.  
The probability distributions for 10kA and 12kA test runs show little 
discernable character other than directing attention to most or all maximum 
current values being at least 10% greater than the target available fault current.  
23kA and 21.5kA test runs show a strong tendency toward Uniform Distribution 
with mean values 7% and 14% higher than target values. 
Coefficients of variation are all less than 10% - 9.3%, 8%, 9.4%, and 9%.  




Analyzing the values from 40 test runs in series #1 suggests the test cell 
consistently sources higher than predicted available currents for 23kA and less, 
and that arc current would continue to fall in the same ranges for each of the four 
test configurations. 
Calculated Incident Heat 
Heat energy imparted to each calorimeter is calculated as follows: 
 𝑞 = 𝑚 ⋅ ∆𝑇 ⋅ 𝑐 (15) 
Where 
q : calculated heat energy in joules 
m : mass in grams 
ΔT : temperature change in degrees Celsius 
c : specific heat  
 
Electrolytic tough pitch (ETP) copper [100] used in most electrical 
applications is 99.9% pure.  Pure copper has a specific heat of 0.386 𝐽 (𝑔 ℃)⁄  at 
37°C.  For an 18g copper slug the conversion equation is then: 
 𝑞 = 18 ⋅ ∆𝑇 ⋅ 0.386 (16) 
For 4cm diameter calorimeters, heat is calculated: 
 𝑞(𝐽 𝑐𝑚2⁄ ) = 0.5529 ⋅ ∆𝑇 (17) 
Arc flash calculations continue to carry the influence of medical research 
into skin burns.  In this arena, thermochemical calories are more common as 
measures of heat energy.  Joules and thermochemical calories are directly 
related by the expression 1 𝑐𝑎𝑙 =  4.184 𝐽.   
This yields the equivalent expression for incident heat energy 






Values for specific heat of copper vary across sources.  Physical 
properties of copper have been studied for many years and the temperature-
dependent nature of this parameter is well understood [101].  The conversion 
constant for 18g copper slug calorimeters used by ASTM and others [102] is 
0.135 to allow for repeated testing with initially very hot calorimeters.  This 
conventional value will be used in this dissertation. 
Tabulated Heat Results 
Table 10 through Table 24, starting on page 305, list test runs’ maximum 
currents scaled to RMS for convenient comparison with expected fault current, 
arc event durations, and calculated incident energy values for each calorimeter.  
Arc durations vary depending on conditions of individual tests.  For safety 
reasons, the test cell was configured to limit arcing time.  Time limits varied 
according to the judgement of the facility manager.  For some tests, the limit was 
150ms, for others 350ms.  Controlled termination of an arc, rather than allow it to 
self-extinguish, does not negate the validity of measurement.  Radiated heat is a 
function of arc duration, especially for persistent arcs. 
Tests performed at low anticipated incident energy had calorimeters 
positioned at 12 inches from the electrode rods.  Series #2 tests where higher 
incident heat values were expected had the calorimeters placed at a 
conventional 18 inches from the electrodes.  Incident energy values’ table cells 
are color-coded according to NFPA 70E injury thresholds as follows 





As described previously, for series #1 runs 1 through 43 the shell of the 
test fixture was connected to earth ground and the grounding cable passed 
through a CT.  Measurements of ground current were collected for each test run 
and included on respective oscillograms.  Several oscillograms have ground 
current scaled where impulses are observable.   
For all series #1 runs, ground current impulses were approximately 100A 
peak.  This value is less than, or much less than, 1% of full scale for currents 
measured.  Furthermore, unlike Stanback’s experiments, there was no erosion of 
the grounded metal shell.  This leads to the observation that greater than 99% of 
arc current passed between the electrode rods and that phase-to-ground arc 
current was a minute contributor to overall arc energy. 
For purposes of comparison, total heat exposure across the sensor array 
is determined from the arithmetic average of each group of seven incident heat 
values.  This methodology is consistent with the work of Lee, Gammon, et al. 
[48]. Average heat, maximum heat, and arc duration are plotted against arc 
current in Figure 26 through Figure 40, beginning on page 284. 
Comparing results from 240-volt runs shown in Figure 26 to those of 
Smoak and Keeth (Table 2 and Table 3) testing meter bases, their conclusion 
that arc flash incident energy would be quite low is born out.  Had they measured 
heat for runs with fault currents as low as 1500A, the values in Table 10 suggest 




With one exception, results depicted in Figure 26 and Figure 28 appear to 
support assertions by Wagner and Fountain [16], Stanback [20], and Jones, 
Liggett, et al. [31] that arcs in a 240-volt single-phase system will self-extinguish 
in two cycles or less.  For arc events with enough available energy, the maximum 
emitted heat correlates with arc duration.  This relationship has been understood 
for many years.    
Coefficients of correlation are calculated for average radiated heat versus 
arc duration in the 40 series #1 events.   
• The 10kA fusing events captured in Figure 26 all emitted less than 0.1 
cal/cm2.  The coefficient of correlation for these 2.4MVA events is -0.13, 
reflecting the erratic nature of low energy arc flash events. 
• While the heat energy releases for 240V @ 23kA (2.9MVA) runs were all 
0.22 cal/cm2 or less, Figure 28 still shows fair correlation with duration: a 
coefficient of 0.45. 
• Figure 27 and Figure 29 show very good or fair correlation between arc 
duration and maximum emitted heat energy for 5.8MVA and 10.3MVA 
480-volt scenarios.  Correlation coefficients are 0.98 for Runs 12 through 
21 and 0.5 for Runs 32 through 41. 
As open circuit voltage increased and greater fault current was made 
available, arc duration, and thus incident heat, increased though not in a straight 
line.  Measured incident heat remained below 0.1 cal/cm2 at all tested currents 
for open circuit voltages 260V, 285V, 354V, and 434V.  Only at 460 volts did 




Voltage Across the Arc 
Once an arc channel is open, the plasma will conduct as much charge 
flow as the source system can deliver with little increase in arc voltage above 
some threshold.  This behavior is highly non-linear and a topic of study to itself.  
What is significant in the area of arc flash is the evidence provided by real-time 
voltage measurements that a plasma conduit is created for an event.  This is 
apparent on oscillograms where the arc persists for several cycles.  The voltage 
waveform is truncated at the breakdown potential for the plasma column created 
by the vaporized copper.  This behavior has been observed by many including 
Stanback who commented on the “square wave” nature of the clipped arc voltage 
plots.  Illustrative examples can be found throughout Appendix A beginning on 
page 132. 
Copper Loss 
Across the course of the series #1 480-volt total test runs, four inches of 
each 3/4-inch copper rod was consumed or an average of approximately 0.2 
inches of each rod (~26gm) was lost to vapor or molten spray during each test.   
Applying Stanback’s estimation method for copper loss to the second set 
of ten 480-volt runs, using measured arc currents and durations, yields a 






× 𝜋 × 4 × 2 = 3.53 𝑐𝑢. 𝑖𝑛.  This suggests Stanback’s method applies best 




Tabulated Arc Blast Pressure Results 
Arc blast pressure measurements were collected with the calorimeter cart 
located at 12 inches from the electrodes and at 18 inches.  With the pressure 
transducer mounted 18 inches above the center calorimeter, this corresponds to 
distances from the arc of 21.6 inches and 25.4 inches.  Measured values of 
maximum arc blast pressure, normalized to 18-inch calorimeter spacing, varied 
from 1.2 psi (8.4kPa) to 223 psi (1539.6kPa).  This corresponds to pressure 
wave intensities of 172.5dBA up to 217.7dBA.  Distance corrected values are 
collected in Table 25 beginning on page 312 and shown graphically in Figure 44 
on page 293.  The red line in the figure identifies the guaranteed eardrum rupture 
threshold.  41% of the values in the series #2 tests evaluated exceed this 
threshold.   
Post-Run Snapshots 
Snapshots were taken at several times during the testing sequence to 
capture results of special interest. 
Figure 46, page 295, shows snapshots following 240-volt, 10,000-amp test 
runs #1, #2, and #9.  Copper spray behind the right-most rod after Run #2 is 
evident.  Considering the absence of rod erosion at this point, the somewhat 
straight line of spray resulted from the melted and splattered copper fuse wire. 
Contrasted with the 240-volt runs, the deposition of copper vapor on the 
back panel from rod erosion after just three 480 volt runs and pronounced by 




of the deposition patterns reflect the photographs of Stokes’ arc flares shown in 
Figure 5. 
It is also apparent from the angular shape of the rod ends and the position 
of the fuse wire remnants that, once initiated, the arc migrated away from the 
point of initiation and then burned at the rod ends and flared outward as the arc 
evolved.  This is a graphic demonstration of the Lorentz Force, described in 
“Migration of the Arc” on page 35.  It may explain why incident energy values in 
series #1 test runs 32 through 41, show calorimeters 6 and 7 at the bottom of the 
array exposed to the greatest heat. 
Figure 48 shows the condition of the test fixture following series #2 test 
76.  By this time, the interior of the fixture shell was heavily coated with copper 
slag primarily due to the preceding 604V @ 14.6kA tests.  Also conspicuous is 
heat damage of fixture finish on the lower rear sides due to arc flares. 
Figure 49 on page 296 focuses on the interior of the fixture at the 
conclusion of series #2.  The ends of the copper electrode rods have been 
burned down to two inches after having been moved down twice during 
preceding tests.  There is heavy accumulation of copper vapor deposited on the 
backplate bottom corners, and a heavy overall buildup of molten copper splatter 
and slag. 
High Speed Video 
High-speed video revealed two characteristic sequences of events for the 
cases in this investigation: 




1. Destruction of the fuse wire, with ejection of molten material, 
varying levels of blast, and minor flash.   
Sequence 2 - example shown in Figure 51, page 297 
1. Initial destruction of the fuse wire, with ejection of molten material 
followed by a short delay 
2. Significant flash and blast event – higher available current extends 
the flash event 
3. Generation of a plasma cloud 
Tests at voltages below 460 volts exhibited both sequences though any 
flash or blast was usually brief.  Evidence of fuse wire welding at tie points and 
observations of behavior in such high-speed videos as 27878, 27880, 27883 
shows the fuse wire tended to heat uniformly and then melt at one or both ends, 
often with a withered remnant of the fuse wire falling away as the arc flash 
developed. 
By contrast, all test runs at 480 volts or greater exhibited all three stages 
listed above for Sequence 2: fusing event with a short delay corresponding to the 
current waveform rising to its peak, flash extending across multiple cycles, and 
plasma cloud and molten spray.  An example from series #1 run 35 is shown in 
Figure 52, page 298. 
High speed video was reconfigured during test series #2 to capture only 
the arcs and flares present during the flash event.  This required reducing the 
framerate from 5000 frames/sec to 2000, increasing the shutter speed to its 
maximum value, and adjusting aperture f-stop to its highest setting.  This 




and flare behavior, especially the ebb and flow of flares at the rod ends as 
current cycled positive and negative. 
Recalling Stokes’ high-speed still images (Figure 5), the clip sequence in 
Figure 53 shows a short, one-cycle fuse and flash sequence that yielded very 
little heat.  Figure 54 shows the multiple cycle 604V event for series #2 run 68, 
video file 34405.  This illustrates arcing events between electrodes and 
aggressive flares at rods ends. 
Sources of Error 
Calorimeter Surface Treatment 
Mary Stoll’s method of collecting heat injury data required blackening the 
target skin area with India ink.  Lee, Gammon, Mandal and Song [103], and 
others painted calorimeter surfaces with flat black paint.  The U.S. Naval 
Radiological Defense Laboratory (USNRDL) treated calorimeters and 
radiometers with either platinum black plating or 3M Velvet Black paint [104].  
Winkler and Sheldahl [105] showed calorimeter surface treatment can affect 
measured temperature for gas streams by as much as 20%. 
For series #1 runs 1 through 43 and series #2 runs 1 through 90, the 
calorimeters were left unpainted.  This could have reduced the thermal 
absorption of the calorimeter faces yielding lower heat rise value.  USNRDL 
results suggest heat could have been under-measured by a factor as great as 
2.5.  
Series #2 test runs 91 through 110 were executed to provide a basis for 




measured incident heat for 460 volts at 20.66kA with calorimeters spaced 
18 inches from the electrodes.  Copper dust on calorimeter faces from previous 
runs was not removed before executing this test sequence.  Tests 101 through 
110 measured incident heat for the same configuration except that calorimeter 
faces were burnished with Scotch-Brite® and coated with Rustoleum® high heat 
2000°F flat black spray paint.  Calorimeter faces were repainted every other test. 
Series #2 tests 91 through 95 exhibited unexpectedly low arc durations in 
contrast to the rest of this group so, for purposes of direct comparison, these 
values will not be considered.  
The average of series #2 tests 96 through 100 heat values for unpainted, 
uncleaned calorimeters is 2.42 cal/cm2. The average maximum heat is 
4.08 cal/cm2.  By comparison, the average heat for tests 101 through 110 is 
2.48 cal/cm2 and the average maximum is 3.69 cal/cm2.  An increase in average 
accumulated heat of only two percent paired with a decrease in average 
maximum value shows the emissivity difference between unpainted and painted 
calorimeters was insignificant.  An explanation for this can be deduced by 
examining the calorimeter faces in Figure 48, page 296.  The copper discs are all 
covered with a uniform brown haze.  Since nothing flammable existed inside the 
test fixture it can be reasonably assumed this was copper dust or black copper 
oxide.  The emissivity values of copper oxide and copper powder have been 
measured as 0.76 - 0.8 [106].  While less than the 0.91 emissivity of 3M Velvet 
Black paint [107] used in others’ tests, it is equivalent to the 0.81 – 0.88 exhibited 




The bright copper of new calorimeter faces would have exhibited 
emissivity less than 0.1 and so would have been less sensitive to incident heat; 
however, once the first few test runs had been executed, they were covered with 
metallic haze.  This haze would have increased the emissivity of the calorimeter 
faces and aligned the measurements from following tests with others’ findings, 
making paint application unnecessary. 
Calorimeter Placement 
During series #1 tests and for some series #2 tests, calorimeters were 
deliberately moved closer to the test fixture to intercept more emitted heat.  This 
relocation, from 18 inches to 12 inches, does not permit direct comparison with 
past work by others who conventionally chose an 18-inch separation.   
For the sake of completeness and accuracy, an arc must be considered 
as a line or column source of radiant heat.  However, for purposes of this 
discussion arcs will be approximated by a point source. Correcting for difference 
in configuration geometry from a point source leads to the following: 
• For the centermost calorimeter, the diameter of a 4 cm disc at 12 
inches projected to 18 inches is 6 cm.  This yields a correction 










𝑜𝑟 1 2.25⁄⁄  for this one calorimeter.  
• Accounting for horizontal angular difference and thus greater 
distance, the correction factor for the other two center row 




• Similarly, for the top and bottom row devices, the correction factor 
is 0.716 2.25⁄ , again due to combined angles and increased 
distance. 
Series #2 tests 33 through 52 were executed to check the suggested 
geometric corrections and determine their validity.  Runs 33 through 42 were 
configured 488 volts at 14.3kA with calorimeters located at 12 inches from the 
electrodes.  Runs 43 through 52 were the same configuration but with the 
calorimeters moved back to 18 inches.  Table 21 and Figure 33 show values for 
the 12-inch setup. Table 22 and Figure 34 show values collected at 18 inches.  
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show probability distributions for these two data sets.  
Distribution of data collected at 12 inches is skewed high and distribution of data 
collected at 18 inches is skewed low.  Deriving an overall correction factor 
requires choosing values to represent these two data sets.  Arithmetic average is 
appropriate in this case because averages are influenced by skew where median 
values are not.  The ratio of average values yields a correction factor of 0.233; 
smaller than the straight ratios developed based on geometry which range 
between 0.314 and 0.444. 
Data Recording Truncation 
The test cell controller was configured to open the source bus contacts at 
a predetermined time.  During series #1 and some series #2 tests, this was one 
cycle past 150 ms.  For all other tests in series #2, this time was 350ms or 




by the test cell would have produced less measured heat, so the reported 
incident heat values for these tests will be low. 
Test series #2 data recording was typically terminated at 500ms.  For 
some instances, the blast pressure wave had not fully developed by this point so 
blast pressure is underreported in these cases. 
Loss of Resolution 
Producing an engineering model for any physical system requires 
developing acceptable approximations.  In the case of arc flash data, one 
approximation is the arithmetic average of incident heat values over the array of 
seven calorimeters.  While such averages will be influenced by hot spots, the 
effects of high temperatures at one or two calorimeters can be reduced by much 
lower ones at others. 
The tradeoff for collecting data into an overall average is the loss of 
accounting for hot spots.  For example, arcs driven down to the ends of the rods 
in series #1 tests 32 through 41 increased the measured heat at the bottom two 
calorimeters to greater than 1.2 cal/cm2 yet all the averages were 0.88 or less.  
Series #2 tests 32 through 52 exhibited increased heat about the left-center and 
center calorimeters but generally lower heat energies on the right. 
Another potential loss of data occurs with a standard seven-element 
calorimeter array set at the conventional 18 inches back from the test fixture.  
The conspicuous difference in probability distribution skew between the 488V 
tests at 12 inches and at 18 inches illustrates how the six additional inches 




are averaged, this results in underestimating exposure of the lower or upper 
body. 
Parameter Sensitivity  
The specific heat of copper varies with temperature.  One historic source 
shows it increasing from a value of 0.3805 at 0°C to 0.3885 at 50°C [101].  Other 
sources list copper specific heat as 0.385 at 20°C [109] for the alloy identified as 
electrolytic tough pitch. For an 18g copper slug calorimeter that is 4cm in 
diameter, this variation causes the temperature-to-energy conversion multiplier to 
vary from 0.130 to 0.133.  The conventional multiplier for calorimeters 
constructed according to ASTM specifications is 0.135.  This value is 3.8% 
greater than that at 0°C and 2.4% greater than that at 20°C.  Examining the 
Henrique integral on page 35, the temperature term is in the denominator of a 
negative exponent of e. Varying the temperature term by 2.4% yields an 
approximately 2% effect on the resulting value of the boundary parameter Ω.  For 
very high energy arc flash events, using a constant conversion value of 0.135 
could result in minor observable variation in predicted degree of skin damage, 
usually erring in the direction of over-estimating heat.  For arc flash events in the 
energy range explored in this dissertation, a 2% difference is insignificant. 
By contrast, the effect of distance and distance correction is pronounced.  
Increasing distance from the origin of the arc flash event by six inches reduces 
incident heat by a factor of at least two and as high as four.  For purposes of 
standard calculations, this distance is controllable.  However, in day-to-day 




basing protective equipment selection on assumed working distances since 
workers’ hands and lower forearms are likely to be closer to an arc flash origin 
than the conventional 18 inches. 
Data Correction 
Empirical evidence in this dissertation’s experiments showed that 
calorimeter surface treatment is not a factor for arc flash tests in the configuration 
used so no correction is required.  
Experimental findings for heat reduction in 12-inch versus 18-inch 
calorimeter spacing yielded a correction multiplier of 0.233 or 1 4.3⁄ .  For 
purposes of this treatise, the corrections based on geometry will be used instead 
because the resulting heat values are greater; that is: the reduction multiplier is 
lower.  This is a more cautious approach.  Heat values for all test runs at or 
normalized to 18 inches are presented in Table 26 starting on page 316.  Color 
codes shown on page 77 are again used to identify calorimeter readings that do, 
or do not, show dangerous levels of incident heat. 
Blast pressure values were collected with the sensor array at both 12 
inches and 18 inches from the electrodes.  Since the blast sensor was mounted 
18 inches above the center calorimeter, this corresponds to 21.6 and 25.4 inches 




distance.  Pressure values at 12-inch cart spacing were reduced by a factor of 
1.178 to normalize them to 18-inch sensor cart spacing. 
Comparing Single-Phase Values to IEEE 1584 
In the absence of an accepted standard method, design engineers or 
system owners may be tempted to apply IEEE 1584-2018 calculations to single-
phase equipment.  This approach yields questionable results since low fault 
energies can precipitate overcurrent device trip times exceeding 900 seconds in 
modeling software and may result in very large incident heat values of hundreds 
with arc flash boundaries in hundreds of feet.  As stated previously, IEEE is clear 
the 1584 method is intended for use only when analyzing three-phase systems. 
As a demonstration comparison, the system configuration and measured 
values are processed through the IEEE 1584-2018 calculation method for open-
circuit voltages 208𝑉 ≤  𝑉𝑂𝐶 < 600𝑉, with incident energy results compared to 
those obtained experimentally.  Results are shown graphically in Figure 43 on 
page 292.  The ratios of IEEE predicted values divided by respective measured 
average heat values are plotted by voltage test group.  Nearly all the ratios are 
greater than 1.0 with most much greater than 1.0.  This demonstrates that the 
IEEE 1584 calculation method overestimates incident heat for single phase 
systems and serves to reinforce the IEEE’s admonition that the 2018 calculation 










The terms arc flash, arc blast, and high energy arc fault describe an event 
that can start fires, damage or destroy equipment and surrounding structures, 
and severely injure or kill personnel.  These dangerous conditions arise when a 
short circuit is introduced into an electrical system with the following results: 
• Very high fault current – thousands of amps 
• Intense radiated heat and light 
• Arc plasma, flares, and plume 
• Explosive sound pressure 
• Molten metal ejecta 
Although three-phase arc flash events have received the most research 
attention, single-phase events should be researched further as they can occur in 
a variety of commercial, industrial, and utility circumstances.  Experimental work 
for this dissertation explored one single-phase electrical configuration and 
revealed both a lower threshold of concern for that configuration and that severe 
burns are probable above that threshold.  Ear and eye injuries are possible or 
likely for any of events in this investigation. 
Observations and Interpretation 
Low Heat Events 
The first and most conspicuous finding apparent from the series #1 and #2 
data and plots is that for open circuit voltage 434 volts and below, for any current 
tested, all but three arc events self-extinguished at less than 50 milliseconds or 
three 60Hz AC cycles.  The incident energy values were all at least one order of 
magnitude less than the 1.2 cal/cm2 threshold for second-degree skin burn.  This 




flash events may be hot enough at the event site to melt the initiating conductor, 
they do not exist long enough to radiate much heat or generate a pronounced 
convective plasma cloud.   
This shows that circuit breaker panels in common residential and light 
commercial applications do not represent a risk of burns from arc flash during an 
accident.  However, this observation must be heavily qualified.  For example, 
high-speed videos 27881 (series #1 run 7), 27882 (series #1 run 8), and 27883 
(series #1 run 9) show that a short duration plasma plume can be created, that 
there can be a flash event, and that a spray of molten particles from the object 
causing the fault can be ejected from the arc site.  This will produce localized 
burns, especially to delicate tissues of the face and thinner skin on the forearms. 
Furthermore, there is still a risk of eye damage due to bright light.   
While arc events at 260 volts did not develop pressure approaching the 
14.5 psi guaranteed eardrum rupture threshold, they did produce blast waves as 
high as 5 to 7 psi.  This translates to as much as 1500 pounds force on an adult 
– enough to assuredly knock a worker off their feet. 
High Heat Events 
Where lower energy arcs generally self-extinguished in a few cycles, most 
arc events at 460 volts and higher persisted for much longer.  This finding 
contradicts assertions made by Jones, Liggett, et al. but aligns with Stanback’s 
results.  The longer arc durations yielded predictably higher measured incident 
energies, e.g., ten times greater than 240-volt events with similar fault current.  




fixture to levels where the electrodes could not be safely handled immediately 
following any of the 480-volt or higher test runs. 
Experimenter and test cell operators agreed the subjective description of 
series #1 480-volt events’ acoustic intensity was equivalent to a shotgun blast, 
even behind protective windows and door.  Greater than 130dB from the two 
sound pressure measurements suggests this description was entirely 
reasonable.  This impression was confirmed by series #2 blast pressure 
measurements which revealed dangerous high-pressure impulses.  Elevated 
heat and sound pressure impulses exceeding safe limits are both evidence that 
single-phase arc flash events in systems 460 volts and higher with 1.5-inch gap 
distance are a likely source of severe injury and equipment damage. 
Plotting incident energy values versus open circuit voltage and available 
fault current for the 1.5-inch arc, and connecting the mean values for the voltage-
specific data sets, more clearly reveals a relationship as shown in Figure 45, 
page 294.  Average data values for 240, 260, 385, and 434-volt sets all clustered 
at less than 0.1 cal/cm2 incident energy, essentially independent of arc current or 
duration.  At 460 volts and greater, enough power is delivered to the arcs that 
incident energy greater than 1.2 cal/cm2 becomes possible.     
Plotting and joining median values, and interpolating where reasonable, 
yields a family of curves that suggest a prediction of incident heat should be 
possible based on open circuit voltage and available fault current.  Experimental 




in a predictive calculation when a shorter interruption time is not introduced by a 
fast-acting overcurrent protective device. 
Because the blast wave is a result of rapid thermally driven expansion 
within and around the arc column, Figure 44 plots maximum pressure against 
corresponding arc current and duration calculated as 𝑖2𝑡.  The value of 𝑖2𝑡 
expresses available thermal energy in an electrical system and is commonly 
used in sizing overcurrent protection devices.  The trend line added to the plot 
suggests the possibility that blast pressure may be predicted.  As detailed in 
Chapter Four : Arc Blast, the threshold for guaranteed eardrum rupture is 
100kPA or 14.5 psi.  40 of the 98 values in Table 25 exceed this threshold; some 
by an order of magnitude.   
As described in Blunt Force Trauma on page 41, an impact of 220kPa 
blast wave to the chest will result in a 25% chance of fracturing ribs.  The most 
extreme of the arc flash events could yield a momentary force of more than 
1500kPa.  While ribs in a living person are quite flexible [110], and total power of 
the blast wave must be evaluated, this level of impulse seems likely to result in 






This dissertation explores the history of arc flash investigations and the 
basis for IEEE 1584 calculations.  It presents the results of experiments 
addressing one gap in that Standard.  The initial hypothesis for this work was 
“Single-phase arc flash energy yield is expected to be less than that 
predicted for three-phase at equivalent voltage and available current.”  
• This conjecture was shown to be true and supported by empirical data.  
Incident heat results are presented in a family of curves that suggest the 
possibility of predicting heat for arc flash in single-phase systems.  This would be 
useful for the following reasons: 
• incident heat values for single-phase arc flash events in systems 460 volts 
and greater are high enough to risk potentially severe burn injury 
• incident heat values in systems 434 volts and lower appear to pose little or 
no risk of burn injury in the configuration investigated 
Blast pressure data were collected, tabulated, and plotted.  Results show 
high risk of hearing damage and potential for significant blunt force trauma when 





Recommendations for Additional Work 
This dissertation’s experimental series investigated one bus configuration, 
Vertical Conductors in a Box, with copper electrode rods spaced a nominal 1.5 
inches, and collected data allowing determination of risk for burn injury and 
hearing loss or blunt force trauma.  In order to provide a complete basis for arc 
flash calculations commensurate with the IEEE 1584 standard, additional 
scenarios should be evaluated. 
Voltages and Currents 
While the results in this dissertation show little or no risk of arc flash burn 
injury for 240 volts at 22kA and as high as 434 volts at 10.9kA, the same may not 
be true for other configurations.  Lower threshold voltages or currents may exist 
depending on the test fixture arrangement.   
Single-phase faults to ground or to an adjacent phase are a likely 
occurrence in utility installations.  Exploring the range of industrial and utility 
medium voltages from 601 volts to 15kV would add to the knowledge basis for 
protective equipment research and the ASTM method based on T. E. Neal’s 
work. 
Bus Configurations 
All five IEEE 1584 configurations may be found in single-phase 
applications and should be fully investigated.  Experimental work for this 
dissertation explored Vertical Conductors in a Box (VCB); however, additional 





• Vertical Conductors in a Box with Barrier (VCBB) 
• Horizontal Conductors in a Box (HCB) 
• Vertical Conductors in Open Air (VOA) 
• Horizontal Conductors in Open Air (HOA) 
Conductor Gaps 
A variety of separation distances exist in all electrical equipment.  These 
spacings should be investigated.  IEEE 1584 section 4.2 identifies ranges for 
conductor gaps as follows: 
• 208 volts to 600 volts – 0.25 inches to 3.0 inches 
• 601 volts to 15kV – 0.75 inches to 10.0 inches 
Eye Injury 
As shown in Chapter Four : Vision Damage, arc flash injury to the eye has 
been explored to varying degrees in the recent past.  Experimenters’ interests 
focused on measurement technology and quantifying the relationship between 
incident energy and type or extent of injury.  Significant additional engineering 
and biomedical cross-discipline collaboration is needed in this arena to: 
• further characterize the wavelengths and energies associated with 
specific types of eye injury (cornea, lens, retina), including 
validation against biological specimens 
• develop and standardize instrumentation for accurately measuring 
short duration impulses of injurious wavelengths and energies 
• extend previous work to offer a predictive algorithm for identifying 




Hearing Damage and Blunt Force Trauma 
Pressure measurements collected during test series #2 revealed the 
possibility of dangerously powerful pressure waves at 12 to 18 inch working 
distances.  Blast pressure measurements should be included as a routine part of 
all future arc flash testing experimental set-ups, with data collection allowed to 
run past the point of maximum blast wave pressure - likely about one second.  
Additional research and analysis of the underlying phenomena, and further data 
collection, are needed to develop and validate an accurate predictive model for 
arc blast wave intensity. 
Arc Column Temperature 
A variety of methods have been employed over the years to measure the 
temperature of the arc column during a flash event.  These have included such 
techniques as inferred values from radiant heat and temperatures calculated 
from sound velocity changes.  One method that offers promise is direct 
measurement by passive microwave.  This approach allows measurements at 
microsecond speeds, unimpaired by obscuring soot or debris.  The effect of 
conductive vapor in the plasma column must be investigated. 
Electrode Materials 
This investigator initially supposed that the melting and vaporization 
temperatures of aluminum being lower than copper would lead to arc flash 
events with significantly greater incident heat energy.  However, discussion with 
the Schneider Electric engineering manager revealed their experience pointed in 




than for copper, the vaporization temperature is only slightly lower.  The 
engineering manager reported previous tests in their facility showed that, rather 
than vaporizing and increasing the conductivity of the plasma column, the 
aluminum melted so rapidly that it simply fell away and puddled in the bottoms of 
test fixtures.  For this reason, investigating arc flash incident heat for aluminum 
conductors as a contrast to copper is not expected to be fruitful. 
Calorimeter Surface Treatment 
The sample set of comparable values based on arc duration turned out to 
be quite small, however the results are consistent with the experience of the 
laboratory operators.  Accumulation of metallic dust on the faces of the 
calorimeters verifiably increased emissivity to the level achieved by using flat 
black paint.  For this reason, further data collection to compare unpainted versus 




Recommendations to Industry 
Consistent with the approach taken in NFPA Standard 70E, 
recommendations for worker protection from possible single-phase arc flash 
events are divided by system voltage.   
Approach boundaries for electric shock protection as detailed in 70E  
article 130.4 must be observed as written for both single-phase and three-phase 
installations for all system voltages. 
Single-Phase 50 – 277 Volts 
The arc flash risk from single-phase events up to 277 volts and 22,000 
amps bolted fault current, where there is no possibility of involving three phases, 
is very low.  Maximum incident heat protection required is 0.2 cal/cm2.  This can 
be accomplished with the flame-resistant garments required for all electrical 
work.  Additionally, a face shield, hard hat, and hearing protection are required.  
Ear plugs must be non-flammable foam with 22dB noise reduction ratio or 
greater. 
Equipment labeling in this voltage and current group shall be as required 
in 70E article 130.5 with the incident heat value set at 0.2 cal/cm2 and no PPE 
category identified.  This includes residential circuit breaker panels for 230-volt 
and 240-volt installations. 
Single-Phase 277 – 434 Volts 
The arc flash risk from single-phase events between 277 volts and 434 
volts and up to 22,000 amps bolted fault current, where there is no possibility of 




possible 1.2 cal/cm2 exposure and shall be selected in accordance with 70E 
article 130.5.  This must include all listed gear including face, head, eye, and ear 
protection.  Ear plugs must be non-flammable foam with 31dB noise reduction 
ratio. 
Equipment labeling in this voltage and current group shall be as required 
in 70E article 130.5 with the incident heat value set at 1.2 cal/cm2. 
Single-Phase 434 – 600 Volts 
The arc flash risk from single-phase events between 434 volts and 600 
volts and up to 15,000 amps bolted fault current, where there is no possibility of 
involving three phases, is high.  Incident heat protection shall be based on a 
possible 8 cal/cm2 exposure and shall be selected in accordance with 70E article 
130.5.  This must include all listed gear including face, head, eye, and ear 
protection.  Hearing protection must include both non-flammable foam ear plugs 
with 31dB noise reduction ratio and earmuffs with 34dB noise reduction ratio or 
better. 
Research and empirical data show high levels of risk for cataracts and 
retinal damage from arc flash in systems 460 volts phase-to-phase and higher.  
Where electrical work must be performed on energized equipment of this type, 
ultraviolet and bright light protection, such as auto-darkening welder’s glasses, 
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Figure 1 - Measured Voltage vs. Theory from Lowke 
 


















Comparison of measured voltages with theory due to Lowke for high-
current, magnetically driven arcs with gaps of 5, 20, 100 and 500mm.  

























Bolted Fault Current (kA)





Figure 3 - Arc Flash from a Meter Base 
 














































Figure 5 - Arc Plume Evolution 
 






















Figure 7 - Plasma Conductivities - Without vs. With Copper vapor 
 
Figure 8 - Arc Migration Due to the Lorentz Force 
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Figure 10 - Deep Partial-Thickness Burns - Surface Temperature vs. Time 
  








































































































Figure 14 - IEEE Vertical Conductors In A Box Test Article 
 





Figure 16 - Single-phase Arc Flash Test Fixture 
 
Figure 17 - Calorimeter Arrangement - Facing Measurement Surfaces 
1 2 
3 4 5 
6 7 










1-Left Upper (LU) 
2-Right Upper (RU) 
3-Left Middle (LM) 
4-Center Middle (CM) 
5-Right Middle (RM) 
6-Left Lower (LL) 






Figure 18 - Copper Slug Calorimeter - Simplified Cross-Section 
 
Figure 19 - Blast Pressure Sensor Mounting and Cable Protection 
Insulating Carrier 
Copper Disk 





Figure 20 - Initial Test Cell Configuration 
 





Figure 22 - Test Series #1 - Calorimeters at 12 inches 
 





Figure 24 - Probability Distributions - Series #1 - 10kA and 12kA Test Runs 
 



































































Figure 26 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 240V @ 10kA 
 








































Max Arc Current (A)
240V @ 10kA








































Max Arc Current (A)
480V @ 12kA





Figure 28 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 240V @ 23kA 
 



































Max Arc Current (A)
240V @ 23kA








































Max Arc Current (A)
480V @ 21.5kA





Figure 30 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 285V @ 18.3kA 
 

















































































Figure 32 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 334V @ 12.9kA 
 

























































































488V @ 14.3kA - 12″





Figure 34 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 488V @ 14.3kA - 18″ 
 













































488V @ 14.3kA - 18″












































Max Arc Current (A)
503V @ 10.5kA





Figure 36 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 604V @ 14.6kA 
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604V @ 14.6kA







































Max Arc Current (A)
434V @ 10.9kA





Figure 38 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 260V @ 9.8kA 
 





































Max Arc Current (A)
260V @ 9.8kA







































Max Arc Current (A)
460V @ 20.7kA - unpainted





Figure 40 - Heat & Arc Duration vs. Current - 460V @ 20.7kA – Painted 
 











































Max Arc Current (A)
460V @ 20.7kA - Painted























Figure 42 - Probability Distribution of Heat Values - 488V @ 14.3kA - 18″ 
 



















































































































Figure 46 - Post-Run Snapshots – Series #1 - #1, #2, #9 
 





Figure 48 - Post-Run Snapshots - Series #2 - #76 
 






Figure 50 - Enlarged Clip of Series #1 Run 6 / 27880 - 240V Fusing Only 
 





Figure 52 - Clips of Series #1 Run 35 / 30048 - Flash Sequence Video 
     
     
     
Clip order is left to right, top to bottom 





     
     
     
     
    
 
Clip order is left to right, top to bottom 

















System Voltage (kV) 
0.48 2.4 4.2 7.2 13.2 14.5 
1 0.42 2.0 3.6 6.3 11.4 29.8 
2 0.83 4.2 7.2 12.5 2.8 59.6 
3 1.25 6.2 10.8 18.7 34.8 910 
5 2.08 10.3 18.0 31.2 57.1 149.2 
10 4.15 20.8 36.0 62.3 114.2 295.5 
15 6.23 31.1 54.0 93.4 171.3 447.7 
20 8.3 41.5 72.0 120.5 228.3 596.7 
30 12.5 62.2 108.0 186.8   
40 16.6 83.0 144.0    
50 20.8 103.8 180.0    









Clearing Time  
(in) (mm) (ms) (cycles) 
1 10KA Bolted Bolted 9585 Y 108.92 6.5 
2 10KA 0.125 3.2 5148 N 8.2 0.5 
3 10KA 0.25 6.4 3852 N 6.58 0.4 
4 20KA 0.042 1.1 7347 N 9.44 0.6 
5 10KA 0.5 12.7 3444 N 6.12 0.4 
6 10KA 1.0 25.4 1446 N 2.6 0.2 
7 * 20KA 0.125 3.2 7812 N 3.71 0.2 
8 ** 10KA N/A N/A 10260 Y 44 2.6 
* 240V phase-to-phase fault in pedestal  ** 240V phase-to-phase fault in meter socket 















Clearing Time  
(in) (mm) (ms) (cycles) 
1 20KA Bolted Bolted 5 11958 Y 150 9 
2 20KA 0.042 1.1 44 11892 N 7.23 0.4 
3 20KA 0.125 3.2 97 8109 N 7.1 0.4 
4 20KA 0.375 9.5 136 4131 N 3.45 0.2 
5 ** 20KA N/A N/A 145 12120 N 19.1 1.1 




Table 4 - Skin Thickness versus Age Group 
 Age Group 
Body Region Skin Layer 18-22 23-53 53-73 
Forehead 
Epidermis 0.203 0.244 0.108 
Dermis (Corium) 2.017 2.006 2.253 
Cheeks 
Epidermis 0.211 0.238 0.214 
Dermis (Corium) 1.352 1.824 1.359 
Anterior Neck 
Epidermis 0.094 0.130 0.084 
Dermis (Corium) 2.419 2.633 3.458 
Thorax (chest) 
Epidermis 0.176 0.132 0.086 
Dermis (Corium) 1.816 3.065 2.192 
Abdomen 
Epidermis 0.218 0.179 0.110 
Dermis (Corium) 2.981 3.075 2.548 
Anterior Arm 
Epidermis 0.150 0.113 0.092 
Dermis (Corium) 4.017 2.220 1.063 
Anterior Forearm 
Epidermis 0.107 0.113 0.092 
Dermis (Corium) 3.014 2.965 1.825 
Anterior Leg 
Epidermis 0.098 0.144 0.100 
Dermis (Corium) 3.330 4.805 2.026 
All thicknesses in millimeters (mm) 
Source material lists first age range as “13-22”.  In the U.S. electrical workers 
potentially exposed to arc flash will be minimum 18 years old. 
Table 5 - Comparison of Skin Burn Classification Systems 
Trad. Reed [111] Lawton [112] U.Roch./Knox [113] 
1st Below Threshold Superficial 1 – Cell damage without acidophilism 
2 – Partial epidermal acidophilism 
3 – Complete epidermal acidophilism 
2nd Partial Thickness Partial Thickness 4 – Partial dermal-epidermal separation 
5 – Complete dermal-epidermal separation 
3rd Full Thickness Deep Dermal 6 – Superficial dermal 
7 – Mid dermal 
8 – Deep dermal 
9 – Complete dermal to adipose border 















1-1 27875 240 10.0kA 18″ spacing 
1-2 27875 240 10.0kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
1-11 27885 240 10.0kA 12″ spacing 
1-12 30025 487 12.3kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
1-21 30034 487 12.3kA 12″ spacing 
1-22 30035 243 22.9kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
1-31 30044 243 22.9kA 12″ spacing 
1-32 30045 485 21.5kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
1-41 30056 485 21.5kA 12″ spacing 
1-42 30056 485 21.5kA Video only 
1-43 30056 485 21.5kA Video only 










2-33 34367 488 14.3kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-42 34376 488 14.3kA 12″ spacing 
2-43 34377 488 14.3kA 18″ spacing 
… … … … … 














2-1 34315 285 18.3kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-11 34338 285 18.3kA 12″ spacing 
2-12 34342 354 13.3kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-22 34354 354 13.3kA 12″ spacing 
2-23 34357 434 12.9kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-32 34366 434 12.9kA 12″ spacing 
2-53 34389 503 10.5kA 18″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-62 34398 503 10.5kA 18″ spacing 
2-63 34400 604 14.6kA 18″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-69 34406 604 14.6kA 18″ spacing 
2-70 34408 434 10. 9kA 18″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-79 34417 434 10. 9kA 18″ spacing 
2-80 34419 260 9.8kA 12″ spacing 
… … … … … 
2-89 34428 260 9.8kA 12″ spacing 










2-91 34432 460 20.7 unpainted 18″ 
… … … … … 
2-100 34442 460 20.7 unpainted 18″ 
2-101 34443 460 20.7 painted 18″ 
… … … … … 













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1-1 27875 10446 31.4 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 
1-2 27876 10153 29.2 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.033 0.068 
1-3 27877 11457 18.1 0.022 0.012 0.016 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 
1-4 27878 11547 26.1 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.011 
1-5 27879 11553 18.5 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.024 
1-6 27880 10015 30.7 0.019 0.027 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.023 0.022 
1-7 27881 10093 30.7 0.017 0.029 0.012 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.026 
1-8 27882 11047 28.2 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.027 0.023 
1-9 27883 10985 33.6 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.019 0.014 0.020 0.015 
1-10 27884 11355 27.9 0.023 0.028 0.016 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.026 
1-11 27885 13768 26.3 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1-12 30025 14141 22.7 0.075 0.057 0.043 0.051 0.041 0.056 0.062 
1-13 30026 14491 188.0 0.842 1.139 0.547 1.782 1.368 1.730 2.565 
1-14 30027 16568 176.6 0.851 1.120 0.732 1.775 1.999 1.974 3.049 
1-15 30028 15466 9.8 0.036 0.060 0.046 0.147 0.191 0.163 0.291 
1-16 30029 16036 14.1 0.127 0.077 0.097 0.110 0.094 0.147 0.124 
1-17 30030 14339 186.9 0.843 1.131 0.670 1.733 1.764 1.752 2.800 
1-18 30031 16226 185.3 0.679 1.101 0.677 1.470 1.906 1.800 2.772 
1-19 30032 16184 82.9 0.769 1.030 0.541 1.408 1.645 1.726 2.474 
1-20 30033 13059 47.0 0.303 0.227 0.162 0.379 0.396 0.477 0.527 
1-21 30034 16619 150.0 0.695 1.110 0.482 1.438 1.691 1.842 2.336 
Arc durations in this group greater than 150ms estimated from raw data.  Arc events terminated 













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1-22 30035 20573 6.1 0.071 0.081 0.044 0.068 0.071 0.070 0.082 
1-23 30036 25115 11.0 0.158 0.077 0.111 0.125 0.080 0.172 0.156 
1-24 30037 26031 6.8 0.114 0.091 0.056 0.114 0.066 0.099 0.103 
1-25 30038 20764 12.4 0.098 0.080 0.059 0.105 0.094 0.170 0.115 
1-26 30039 25844 17.8 0.172 0.084 0.080 0.125 0.126 0.167 0.150 
1-27 30040 26837 8.4 0.118 0.068 0.089 0.135 0.073 0.202 0.161 
1-28 30041 25156 12.1 0.140 0.086 0.092 0.111 0.079 0.134 0.128 
1-29 30042 24208 19.4 0.100 0.070 0.074 0.103 0.085 0.155 0.137 
1-30 30043 26965 10.4 0.103 0.108 0.088 0.128 0.083 0.220 0.138 
1-31 30044 26489 16.0 0.117 0.123 0.120 0.174 0.136 0.233 0.226 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1-32 30045 27227 184.8 1.265 1.475 1.246 2.023 1.978 4.403 3.043 
1-33 30046 24685 182.0 1.012 1.651 0.909 2.096 2.279 4.918 3.347 
1-34 30047 26882 176.0 1.279 1.748 1.130 2.273 2.747 5.357 4.035 
1-35 30048 25257 185.0 1.183 1.737 0.917 2.143 2.541 5.142 3.480 
1-36 30049 24063 163.9 1.039 1.608 0.902 1.904 2.671 3.448 3.374 
1-37 30050 25932 190.4 0.990 1.720 1.024 2.113 2.735 4.441 3.712 
1-38 30051 23200 188.7 1.090 1.555 0.943 2.043 2.813 3.894 4.220 
1-39 30052 26093 150.7 1.033 1.580 0.878 1.621 2.589 3.350 3.409 
1-40 30053 20608 170.4 1.080 1.567 0.835 2.076 2.579 3.423 4.002 
1-41 30054 21539 188.4 0.995 1.605 0.794 2.085 2.570 3.352 3.740 
Arc durations in this group greater than 150ms estimated from raw data.  Arc events terminated 













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-1 34315 21491 14.3 0.208 0.109 0.097 0.240 0.168 0.225 0.200 
2-2 34316 23238 16.2 0.318 0.167 0.201 0.311 0.188 0.274 0.194 
2-3 34317 23246 24.1 0.205 0.151 0.115 0.229 0.123 0.250 0.162 
2-4 34318 24001 15.9 0.211 0.134 0.127 0.243 0.153 0.257 0.155 
2-5 34330 21479 13.7 0.160 0.096 0.094 0.161 0.107 0.156 0.145 
2-6 34333 23588 15.6 0.242 0.152 0.124 0.244 0.160 no data 0.162 
2-7 34334 23491 16.4 0.205 0.127 0.145 0.247 0.126 no data 0.178 
2-8 34335 22958 10.5 0.141 0.117 0.118 0.261 0.104 no data 0.156 
2-9 34336 23265 32.4 omitted – no data 
2-10 34337 21819 17.9 0.163 0.111 0.115 0.242 0.127 0.194 0.194 
2-11 34338 21491 18.6 0.178 0.136 0.146 0.203 0.100 0.178 0.258 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-12 34342 18509 10.2 0.092 0.095 0.056 0.117 0.063 0.093 0.091 
2-13 34343 17864 18.1 0.087 0.076 0.067 0.125 0.068 0.099 0.132 
2-14 34344 14254 21.1 0.102 0.078 0.044 0.118 0.059 0.096 0.086 
2-15 34345 12550 21.9 0.087 0.055 0.041 0.099 0.053 0.090 0.169 
2-16 34346 18236 15.8 0.125 0.088 0.065 0.125 0.066 0.116 0.126 
2-17 34349 15132 14.5 0.034 0.027 0.022 0.042 0.028 0.032 0.047 
2-18 34350 18317 10.0 0.115 0.069 0.062 0.118 0.072 0.099 0.087 
2-19 34351 17037 12.3 0.064 0.064 0.032 0.077 0.034 0.069 0.082 
2-20 34352 18130 11.6 0.139 0.079 0.087 0.135 0.079 0.091 0.135 
2-21 34353 18436 16.4 0.160 0.092 0.077 0.166 0.086 0.168 0.118 














Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-23 34357 18757 28.5 0.277 0.148 0.113 0.291 0.197 0.319 0.243 
2-24 34358 20533 48.8 1.132 0.357 0.247 0.702 0.685 0.878 0.378 
2-25 34359 22043 16.5 0.370 0.147 0.184 0.340 0.201 0.328 0.218 
2-26 34360 14461 38.3 0.104 0.108 0.060 0.121 0.065 0.120 0.171 
2-27 34361 19538 94.1 1.447 0.511 0.389 1.004 0.859 1.197 0.764 
2-28 34362 22006 183.0 5.060 1.574 0.940 2.494 2.761 2.770 1.157 
2-29 34363 22450 74.9 1.718 0.701 0.398 1.158 0.972 1.253 0.539 
2-30 34364 21443 26.4 0.323 0.196 0.170 0.303 0.187 0.291 0.168 
2-31 34365 18516 14.3 0.158 0.100 0.083 0.161 0.078 0.232 0.166 
2-32 34366 16244 22.0 0.177 0.122 0.096 0.246 0.112 0.249 0.186 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-53 34389 13432 174.5 0.601 0.524 0.248 0.591 0.690 0.575 0.310 
2-54 34390 12606 169.3 0.769 0.586 0.311 0.701 0.605 0.617 0.512 
2-55 34391 12640 194.0 0.688 0.472 0.335 0.642 0.793 0.646 0.398 
2-56 34392 10723 31.2 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.022 0.044 0.029 
2-57 34393 10297 163.4 0.694 0.490 0.241 0.593 0.652 0.490 0.331 
2-58 34394 11079 187.8 0.873 0.624 0.445 0.796 0.628 0.741 0.481 
2-59 34395 13659 58.9 0.184 0.099 0.123 0.207 0.128 0.151 0.226 
2-60 34396 12281 157.5 0.792 0.473 0.204 0.538 0.719 0.584 0.310 
2-61 34397 11438 164.5 0.749 0.555 0.322 0.723 0.802 0.489 0.400 














Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-63 34400 20814 241.8 2.188 1.534 0.830 1.684 2.255 1.937 0.932 
2-64 34401 10418 328.4 3.467 2.484 1.030 2.763 3.434 2.722 1.672 
2-65 34402 No Data 3.910 2.333 1.140 2.623 3.161 2.453 1.710 
2-66 34403 16028 306.8 3.580 2.181 1.038 2.708 3.334 2.296 1.358 
2-67 34404 15885 305.7 4.261 2.526 1.043 2.545 3.891 2.721 1.605 
2-68 34405 21116 359.6 5.421 3.007 1.407 3.551 4.342 3.386 2.157 
2-69 34406 19308 358.5 6.465 2.858 1.196 3.578 5.113 3.337 2.000 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-70 34408 14852 15.6 0.031 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.028 
2-71 34409 18928 10.1 0.159 0.091 0.066 0.111 0.282 0.127 0.078 
2-72 34410 18529 9.9 0.093 0.053 0.060 0.113 0.061 0.081 0.068 
2-73 34411 18986 10.8 0.151 0.054 0.057 0.081 0.075 0.111 0.068 
2-74 34412 13613 15.5 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.024 
2-75 34413 18948 11.2 0.142 0.062 0.063 0.108 0.114 0.137 0.081 
2-76 34414 14499 15.6 0.060 0.035 0.032 0.040 0.044 0.045 0.041 
2-77 34415 17471 13.1 0.055 0.040 0.049 0.060 0.055 0.059 0.056 
2-78 34416 15099 15.5 0.118 0.046 0.047 0.062 0.056 0.096 0.061 














Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-80 34419 17614 7.8 0.066 0.035 0.043 0.066 0.044 0.054 0.058 
2-81 34420 19959 11.6 0.143 0.076 0.090 0.158 0.103 0.131 0.094 
2-82 34421 19683 8.2 0.096 0.066 0.066 0.118 0.096 0.094 0.092 
2-83 34422 19320 8.0 0.142 0.083 0.057 0.125 0.083 0.095 0.127 
2-84 34423 20977 10.9 0.104 0.101 0.072 0.132 0.078 0.115 0.143 
2-85 34424 17974 8.3 0.073 0.038 0.024 0.058 0.032 0.101 0.048 
2-86 34425 21311 8.9 0.150 0.091 0.057 0.154 0.091 0.137 0.123 
2-87 34426 18334 7.8 0.060 0.064 0.042 0.075 0.058 0.063 0.062 
2-88 34427 21040 9.4 0.131 0.080 0.069 0.114 0.070 0.103 0.087 
2-89 34428 20969 8.8 0.085 0.077 0.068 0.101 0.081 0.088 0.154 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-33 34367 16949 186.7 6.343 2.263 1.087 3.245 4.007 5.049 1.348 
2-34 34368 13969 97.1 1.662 0.688 0.321 0.974 1.249 1.336 0.466 
2-35 34369 20522 193.4 5.603 1.993 1.184 3.378 3.342 4.421 1.231 
2-36 34370 20886 133.2 3.910 1.407 0.823 2.176 2.277 2.584 1.009 
2-37 34371 19167 185.7 5.693 2.035 0.982 3.176 3.396 3.792 1.301 
2-38 34372 18076 181.2 5.562 1.965 1.159 3.269 3.606 4.579 1.398 
2-39 34373 17784 104.0 3.005 1.239 0.647 1.812 1.648 2.422 0.809 
2-40 3474 12503 154.9 4.074 1.567 0.943 2.671 2.455 3.822 1.161 
2-41 34375 20323 16.1 0.560 0.175 0.179 0.350 0.346 0.549 0.249 













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-43 34377 16016 21.2 0.062 0.052 0.050 0.068 0.039 0.082 0.053 
2-44 34378 21323 174.2 1.411 0.999 0.497 1.166 1.356 0.936 0.646 
2-45 34379 19361 115.4 1.143 0.543 0.277 0.678 0.724 0.784 0.358 
2-46 34380 20799 192.9 1.737 0.990 0.590 1.481 1.205 1.367 0.794 
2-47 34381 15235 21.7 0.042 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.056 0.073 
2-48 34382 20980 83.8 0.914 0.494 0.268 0.639 0.675 0.545 0.257 
2-49 34383 17396 14.3 0.044 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.024 0.044 0.044 
2-50 34384 20995 192.5 1.107 0.777 0.443 0.969 1.009 0.866 0.652 
2-51 34385 21200 25.8 0.155 0.083 0.094 0.134 0.097 0.141 0.115 
2-52 34386 17276 45.8 0.293 0.157 0.142 0.240 0.187 0.356 0.194 









Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-91 34432 27603 67.3 0.771 0.432 0.236 0.491 0.580 0.525 0.342 
2-92 34434 26460 62.7 0.536 0.285 0.270 0.439 0.632 0.542 0.236 
2-93 34435 23067 91.2 1.155 0.621 0.388 0.858 0.860 1.126 0.489 
2-94 34436 27163 13.4 0.089 0.082 0.061 0.094 0.070 0.084 0.091 
2-95 34437 17685 104.0 0.033 0.031 0.020 0.031 0.029 0.017 0.024 
2-96 34438 22373 307.8 3.726 1.986 1.226 2.436 2.553 2.560 1.692 
2-97 34439 27102 258.4 5.605 2.786 1.294 3.625 3.616 3.608 1.996 
2-98 34440 27311 162.0* 2.616 1.483 0.776 1.641 2.326 1.817 1.110 
2-100 34441 25662 163.4* 4.649 1.645 1.923 3.569 3.043 5.573 1.456 
* Arc events terminated by test cell controller.  













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER 
# Osc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2-101 34443 26030 164.5* 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 
2-102 34444 21848 156.4* 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 
2-103 34445 24064 164.3* 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 
2-104 34446 24596 162.1* 3.694 1.677 1.502 2.712 2.298 2.679 1.431 
2-105 34447 24659 162.0* 3.234 1.707 1.133 2.441 2.333 2.536 1.185 
2-106 34448 21997 163.2* 2.908 1.611 1.272 2.214 2.435 2.309 1.105 
2-107 34449 25301 165.1* 2.943 1.654 1.361 2.238 2.409 2.371 1.289 
2-109 34450 24578 162.0* 3.546 1.599 1.254 2.276 2.523 2.477 1.069 
2-110 34451 17638 163.0* 2.532 1.540 1.419 1.995 2.298 2.510 1.207 
* Arc events terminated by test cell controller.  
Arc durations = 150ms + not more than one cycle (16.7ms). 
 
Table 25 Continued 
Amps Duration I2t MaxPSI kPa dbA 
17614 7.8 2.42E+09 1.7 11.9 175.5 
18334 7.8 2.62E+09 2.6 18.2 179.2 
17974 8.3 2.68E+09 1.2 8.5 172.6 
13613 15.5 2.87E+09 1.9 12.9 176.2 
19320 8 2.99E+09 2.9 20.3 180.1 
19683 8.2 3.18E+09 3.7 25.5 182.1 
14499 15.6 3.28E+09 2.6 18.0 179.1 
15132 14.5 3.32E+09 1.0 7.1 171.1 
18317 10 3.36E+09 2.7 18.7 179.4 
18529 9.9 3.40E+09 4.0 27.3 182.7 
14852 15.6 3.44E+09 2.0 13.8 176.8 
12550 21.9 3.45E+09 1.6 10.9 174.8 
18509 10.2 3.49E+09 2.6 17.8 179.0 
15099 15.5 3.53E+09 3.8 25.9 182.2 
17037 12.3 3.57E+09 1.5 10.4 174.3 




Table 25 Continued 
Amps Duration I2t MaxPSI kPa dbA 
10723 31.17 3.58E+09 2.9 19.9 180.0 
18928 10.11 3.62E+09 5.8 39.7 185.9 
16045 14.5 3.73E+09 2.7 18.6 179.4 
18130 11.6 3.81E+09 2.7 18.8 179.5 
20969 8.8 3.87E+09 3.4 23.2 181.3 
18986 10.8 3.89E+09 4.7 32.1 184.1 
17471 13.11 4.00E+09 3.5 23.8 181.5 
18948 11.2 4.02E+09 5.9 40.9 186.2 
21311 8.9 4.04E+09 3.5 24.0 181.6 
13787 21.5 4.09E+09 2.0 13.6 176.6 
21040 9.4 4.16E+09 3.1 21.6 180.7 
17685 13.38 4.18E+09 10.4 71.6 191.1 
14254 21.1 4.29E+09 1.9 13.4 176.5 
17396 14.3 4.33E+09 3.4 23.7 181.5 
19959 11.6 4.62E+09 3.7 25.2 182.0 
20977 10.9 4.80E+09 3.4 23.5 181.4 
18516 14.3 4.90E+09 3.4 23.4 181.4 
15235 21.66 5.03E+09 3.4 23.1 181.3 
18236 15.8 5.25E+09 2.4 16.6 178.4 
16016 21.2 5.44E+09 4.5 31.2 183.9 
22958 10.5 5.53E+09 3.1 21.7 180.7 
18436 16.4 5.57E+09 3.2 22.3 181.0 
17864 18.1 5.78E+09 2.8 19.5 179.8 
16244 22 5.81E+09 4.9 33.7 184.5 
21479 13.7 6.32E+09 6.1 42.0 186.4 
21491 14.3 6.60E+09 3.0 20.9 180.4 
20323 16.1 6.65E+09 5.0 34.6 184.8 
18266 20.5 6.84E+09 4.7 32.3 184.2 
14461 38.3 8.01E+09 2.7 18.9 179.5 
22043 16.5 8.02E+09 7.4 51.2 188.2 
23588 15.6 8.68E+09 4.0 27.5 182.8 




Table 25 Continued 
Amps Duration I2t MaxPSI kPa dbA 
21819 18.6 8.85E+09 3.7 25.8 182.2 
23491 16.4 9.05E+09 4.1 28.1 183.0 
24001 15.9 9.16E+09 5.2 35.6 185.0 
23265 17.9 9.69E+09 4.6 31.5 184.0 
18757 28.5 1.00E+10 4.6 31.8 184.0 
13659 58.88 1.10E+10 10.2 70.4 190.9 
21200 25.79 1.16E+10 12.7 87.9 192.9 
21443 26.4 1.21E+10 5.8 40.2 186.1 
23246 24.1 1.30E+10 4.1 28.3 183.0 
17276 45.8 1.37E+10 12.4 85.7 192.6 
10297 163.4 1.73E+10 55.1 379.6 205.6 
13969 97.1 1.89E+10 18.9 130.2 196.3 
20533 48.78 2.06E+10 10.2 70.5 190.9 
11438 164.5 2.15E+10 55.0 379.3 205.6 
11079 187.8 2.31E+10 89.3 615.8 209.8 
13192 133 2.31E+10 58.9 405.8 206.1 
12281 157.5 2.38E+10 63.9 440.5 206.9 
12503 154.9 2.42E+10 72.0 496.5 207.9 
12606 169.3 2.69E+10 89.3 615.8 209.8 
12640 194 3.10E+10 50.8 350.6 204.9 
13432 174.5 3.15E+10 49.3 339.9 204.6 
17784 104 3.29E+10 70.6 486.7 207.7 
23067 62.74 3.34E+10 28.6 197.4 199.9 
10418 328.4 3.56E+10 89.3 615.8 209.8 
19538 94.11 3.59E+10 13.9 95.8 193.6 
20980 83.8 3.69E+10 40.4 278.2 202.9 
22450 74.9 3.77E+10 30.6 210.8 200.5 
19361 115.4 4.33E+10 40.1 276.7 202.8 
26460 67.31 4.71E+10 52.1 359.5 205.1 
17638 163 5.07E+10 191.1 1,317.3 216.4 
22373 104 5.21E+10 45.0 310.0 203.8 




Table 25 Continued 
Amps Duration I2t MaxPSI kPa dbA 
20886 133.2 5.81E+10 53.2 366.8 205.3 
18076 181.2 5.92E+10 62.3 429.3 206.6 
27163 91.16 6.73E+10 53.7 370.1 205.3 
19167 185.7 6.82E+10 75.8 522.8 208.3 
20881 163.4 7.12E+10 160.6 1,107.6 214.9 
21848 156.4 7.47E+10 221.8 1,529.5 217.7 
15885 305.7 7.71E+10 100.7 694.0 210.8 
16028 306.8 7.88E+10 138.5 955.2 213.6 
21997 163.2 7.90E+10 175.9 1,212.5 215.7 
21323 174.2 7.92E+10 89.3 615.8 209.8 
20522 193.4 8.15E+10 75.8 522.8 208.3 
20799 192.9 8.34E+10 89.3 615.8 209.8 
20995 192.5 8.49E+10 75.2 518.7 208.3 
23331 162.3 8.83E+10 188.9 1,302.7 216.3 
22006 183 8.86E+10 70.1 483.0 207.7 
24064 164.3 9.51E+10 168.9 1,164.3 215.3 
24578 162 9.79E+10 159.3 1,098.2 214.8 
24596 162.1 9.81E+10 142.6 983.1 213.8 
24659 162 9.85E+10 154.4 1,064.6 214.5 
20814 241.8 1.05E+11 89.3 615.8 209.8 
25521 162 1.06E+11 210.5 1,451.5 217.2 
25301 165.1 1.06E+11 223.3 1,539.7 217.7 
25662 162 1.07E+11 218.9 1,509.0 217.6 
26030 164.5 1.11E+11 217.2 1,497.7 217.5 
19308 358.5 1.34E+11 150.8 1,039.9 214.3 
21116 359.6 1.60E+11 146.2 1,007.8 214.0 
27311 258.4 1.93E+11 111.7 769.8 211.7 














Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
240 Volts @ 10,000 Amps 
1-1 10446 31.4 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.010 
1-2 10153 29.2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.010 0.022 
1-3 11457 18.1 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.007 
1-4 11547 26.1 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
1-5 11553 18.5 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.008 
1-6 10015 30.7 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 
1-7 10093 30.7 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 
1-8 11047 28.2 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.013 
1-9 10985 33.6 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008 
1-10 11355 27.9 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.012 
1-11 13768 26.3 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
480 Volts @ 12,300 Amps 
1-12 14141 22.7 0.024 0.018 0.014 0.023 0.013 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.024 
1-13 14491 188.0 0.268 0.362 0.172 0.792 0.430 0.551 0.816 0.484 0.816 
1-14 16568 176.6 0.271 0.356 0.230 0.789 0.628 0.628 0.970 0.553 0.970 
1-15 15466 9.8 0.011 0.019 0.014 0.065 0.060 0.052 0.093 0.045 0.093 
1-16 16036 14.1 0.040 0.025 0.030 0.049 0.030 0.047 0.039 0.037 0.049 
1-17 14339 186.9 0.268 0.360 0.211 0.770 0.554 0.558 0.891 0.516 0.891 
1-18 16226 185.3 0.216 0.350 0.213 0.653 0.599 0.573 0.882 0.498 0.882 
1-19 16184 82.9 0.245 0.328 0.170 0.626 0.517 0.549 0.787 0.460 0.787 
1-20 13059 47.0 0.096 0.072 0.051 0.168 0.124 0.152 0.168 0.119 0.168 
1-21 16619 150.0 0.221 0.353 0.151 0.639 0.531 0.586 0.743 0.461 0.743 
243 Volts @ 22,900 Amps  
1-22 20573 6.1 0.023 0.026 0.014 0.030 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.030 
1-23 25115 11.0 0.050 0.025 0.035 0.056 0.025 0.055 0.050 0.042 0.056 
1-24 26031 6.8 0.036 0.029 0.018 0.051 0.021 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.051 
1-25 20764 12.4 0.031 0.025 0.019 0.047 0.030 0.054 0.037 0.035 0.054 












Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
1-26 25844 17.8 0.055 0.027 0.025 0.056 0.040 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.056 
1-27 26837 8.4 0.038 0.022 0.028 0.060 0.023 0.064 0.051 0.041 0.064 
1-28 25156 12.1 0.045 0.027 0.029 0.049 0.025 0.043 0.041 0.037 0.049 
1-29 24208 19.4 0.032 0.022 0.023 0.046 0.027 0.049 0.044 0.035 0.049 
1-30 26965 10.4 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.057 0.026 0.070 0.044 0.042 0.070 
1-31 26489 16.0 0.037 0.039 0.038 0.077 0.043 0.074 0.072 0.054 0.077 
485 Volts @ 21,500 Amps  
1-32 27227 184.8 0.403 0.469 0.392 0.899 0.622 1.401 0.968 0.736 1.401 
1-33 24685 182.0 0.322 0.525 0.286 0.932 0.716 1.565 1.065 0.773 1.565 
1-34 26882 176.0 0.407 0.556 0.355 1.010 0.863 1.705 1.284 0.883 1.705 
1-35 25257 185.0 0.376 0.553 0.288 0.952 0.798 1.636 1.107 0.816 1.636 
1-36 24063 163.9 0.331 0.512 0.283 0.846 0.839 1.097 1.074 0.712 1.097 
1-37 25932 190.4 0.315 0.547 0.322 0.939 0.859 1.413 1.181 0.797 1.413 
1-38 23200 188.7 0.347 0.495 0.296 0.908 0.884 1.239 1.343 0.787 1.343 
1-39 26093 150.7 0.329 0.503 0.276 0.720 0.814 1.066 1.085 0.685 1.085 
1-40 20608 170.4 0.344 0.499 0.262 0.923 0.810 1.089 1.274 0.743 1.274 
1-41 21539 188.4 0.317 0.511 0.249 0.927 0.808 1.067 1.190 0.724 1.190 
285 Volts @ 18,300 Amps  
2-1 21491 14.3 0.066 0.035 0.031 0.107 0.053 0.072 0.064 0.061 0.107 
2-2 23238 16.2 0.101 0.053 0.063 0.138 0.059 0.087 0.062 0.081 0.138 
2-3 23246 24.1 0.065 0.048 0.036 0.102 0.039 0.080 0.051 0.060 0.102 
2-4 24001 15.9 0.067 0.043 0.040 0.108 0.048 0.082 0.049 0.062 0.108 
2-5 21479 13.7 0.051 0.031 0.030 0.072 0.034 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.072 
2-6 23588 15.6 0.077 0.048 0.039 0.108 0.050 0.000 0.051 0.054 0.108 
2-7 23491 16.4 0.065 0.040 0.045 0.110 0.040 0.000 0.057 0.051 0.110 
2-8 22958 10.5 0.045 0.037 0.037 0.116 0.033 0.000 0.050 0.045 0.116 
2-9 omitted 
2-10 23265 17.9 0.052 0.035 0.036 0.108 0.040 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.108 












Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
354 Volts @ 13,300 Amps  
2-12 18509 10.2 0.029 0.030 0.018 0.052 0.020 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.052 
2-13 17864 18.1 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.056 0.021 0.032 0.042 0.032 0.056 
2-14 14254 21.1 0.033 0.025 0.014 0.052 0.019 0.031 0.027 0.029 0.052 
2-15 12550 21.9 0.028 0.018 0.013 0.044 0.017 0.029 0.054 0.029 0.054 
2-16 18236 15.8 0.040 0.028 0.020 0.056 0.021 0.037 0.040 0.034 0.056 
2-17 15132 14.5 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.019 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.019 
2-18 18317 10.0 0.037 0.022 0.019 0.052 0.023 0.032 0.028 0.030 0.052 
2-19 17037 12.3 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.034 0.011 0.022 0.026 0.021 0.034 
2-20 18130 11.6 0.044 0.025 0.027 0.060 0.025 0.029 0.043 0.036 0.060 
2-21 18436 16.4 0.051 0.029 0.024 0.074 0.027 0.054 0.038 0.042 0.074 
434 Volts @ 12,900 Amps  
2-22 13787 21.5 0.032 0.020 0.018 0.043 0.021 0.033 0.025 0.027 0.043 
2-23 18757 28.5 0.088 0.047 0.036 0.129 0.062 0.101 0.077 0.077 0.129 
2-24 20533 48.8 0.360 0.113 0.078 0.312 0.215 0.279 0.120 0.211 0.360 
2-25 22043 16.5 0.118 0.047 0.058 0.151 0.063 0.104 0.069 0.087 0.151 
2-26 14461 38.3 0.033 0.034 0.019 0.054 0.020 0.038 0.055 0.036 0.055 
2-27 19538 94.1 0.460 0.163 0.122 0.446 0.270 0.381 0.243 0.298 0.460 
2-28 22006 183.0 1.610 0.501 0.295 1.108 0.868 0.882 0.368 0.805 1.610 
2-29 22450 74.9 0.547 0.223 0.125 0.515 0.305 0.399 0.172 0.327 0.547 
2-30 21443 26.4 0.103 0.062 0.053 0.135 0.059 0.093 0.053 0.080 0.135 
2-31 18516 14.3 0.050 0.032 0.026 0.072 0.024 0.074 0.053 0.047 0.074 
488 Volts @ 14,300 Amps  
2-32 16244 22.0 0.056 0.039 0.030 0.109 0.035 0.079 0.059 0.058 0.109 
2-33 16949 186.7 2.018 0.720 0.342 1.442 1.259 1.607 0.429 1.117 2.018 
2-34 13969 97.1 0.529 0.219 0.101 0.433 0.392 0.425 0.148 0.321 0.529 
2-35 20522 193.4 1.783 0.634 0.372 1.501 1.050 1.407 0.392 1.020 1.783 
2-36 20886 133.2 1.244 0.448 0.259 0.967 0.715 0.822 0.321 0.682 1.244 












Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
2-38 18076 181.2 1.770 0.625 0.364 1.453 1.133 1.457 0.445 1.035 1.770 
2-39 17784 104.0 0.956 0.394 0.203 0.805 0.518 0.771 0.257 0.558 0.956 
2-40 12503 154.9 1.297 0.499 0.296 1.187 0.771 1.216 0.370 0.805 1.297 
2-41 20323 16.1 0.178 0.056 0.056 0.156 0.109 0.175 0.079 0.116 0.178 
2-42 18266 20.5 0.055 0.044 0.037 0.110 0.039 0.074 0.065 0.061 0.110 
2-43 16016 21.2 0.062 0.052 0.050 0.068 0.039 0.082 0.053 0.058 0.082 
2-44 21323 174.2 1.411 0.999 0.497 1.166 1.356 0.936 0.646 1.002 1.411 
2-45 19361 115.4 1.143 0.543 0.277 0.678 0.724 0.784 0.358 0.644 1.143 
2-46 20799 192.9 1.737 0.990 0.590 1.481 1.205 1.367 0.794 1.166 1.737 
2-47 15235 21.7 0.042 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.056 0.073 0.049 0.073 
2-48 20980 83.8 0.914 0.494 0.268 0.639 0.675 0.545 0.257 0.542 0.914 
2-49 17396 14.3 0.044 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.024 0.044 0.044 0.037 0.044 
2-50 20995 192.5 1.107 0.777 0.443 0.969 1.009 0.866 0.652 0.832 1.107 
2-51 21200 25.8 0.155 0.083 0.094 0.134 0.097 0.141 0.115 0.117 0.155 
2-52 17276 45.8 0.293 0.157 0.142 0.240 0.187 0.356 0.194 0.224 0.356 
503 Volts @ 10,500 Amps  
2-53 13432 174.5 0.601 0.524 0.248 0.591 0.690 0.575 0.310 0.505 0.690 
2-54 12606 169.3 0.769 0.586 0.311 0.701 0.605 0.617 0.512 0.586 0.769 
2-55 12640 194.0 0.688 0.472 0.335 0.642 0.793 0.646 0.398 0.568 0.793 
2-56 10723 31.2 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.022 0.044 0.029 0.030 0.044 
2-57 10297 163.4 0.694 0.490 0.241 0.593 0.652 0.490 0.331 0.499 0.694 
2-58 11079 187.8 0.873 0.624 0.445 0.796 0.628 0.741 0.481 0.655 0.873 
2-59 13659 58.9 0.184 0.099 0.123 0.207 0.128 0.151 0.226 0.160 0.226 
2-60 12281 157.5 0.792 0.473 0.204 0.538 0.719 0.584 0.310 0.517 0.792 
2-61 11438 164.5 0.749 0.555 0.322 0.723 0.802 0.489 0.400 0.577 0.802 
2-62 13192 133.0 0.648 0.380 0.262 0.603 0.422 0.684 0.332 0.476 0.684 
604 Volts @ 14,600 Amps  
2-63 20814 241.8 2.188 1.534 0.830 1.684 2.255 1.937 0.932 1.623 2.255 












Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
2-65 no data 0.688 3.910 2.333 1.140 2.623 3.161 2.453 1.710 2.476 
2-66 16028 306.8 3.580 2.181 1.038 2.708 3.334 2.296 1.358 2.356 3.580 
2-67 15885 305.7 4.261 2.526 1.043 2.545 3.891 2.721 1.605 2.656 4.261 
2-68 21116 359.6 5.421 3.007 1.407 3.551 4.342 3.386 2.157 3.325 5.421 
2-69 19308 358.5 6.465 2.858 1.196 3.578 5.113 3.337 2.000 3.507 6.465 
434 Volts @ 10,900 Amps  
2-70 14852 15.6 0.031 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.031 
2-71 18928 10.1 0.159 0.091 0.066 0.111 0.282 0.127 0.078 0.131 0.282 
2-72 18529 9.9 0.093 0.053 0.060 0.113 0.061 0.081 0.068 0.076 0.113 
2-73 18986 10.8 0.151 0.054 0.057 0.081 0.075 0.111 0.068 0.085 0.151 
2-74 13613 15.5 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.025 
2-75 18948 11.2 0.142 0.062 0.063 0.108 0.114 0.137 0.081 0.101 0.142 
2-76 14499 15.6 0.060 0.035 0.032 0.040 0.044 0.045 0.041 0.043 0.060 
2-77 17471 13.1 0.055 0.040 0.049 0.060 0.055 0.059 0.056 0.053 0.060 
2-78 11438 164.5 0.118 0.046 0.047 0.062 0.056 0.096 0.061 0.070 0.118 
2-79 13192 133.0 0.028 0.024 0.031 0.032 0.028 0.039 0.052 0.034 0.052 
260 Volts @ 9,800 Amps  
2-80 17614 7.8 0.021 0.011 0.014 0.029 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.029 
2-81 19959 11.6 0.045 0.024 0.028 0.070 0.032 0.042 0.030 0.039 0.070 
2-82 19683 8.2 0.031 0.021 0.021 0.052 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.052 
2-83 19320 8.0 0.045 0.026 0.018 0.056 0.026 0.030 0.040 0.034 0.056 
2-84 20977 10.9 0.033 0.032 0.023 0.059 0.024 0.037 0.046 0.036 0.059 
2-85 17974 8.3 0.023 0.012 0.007 0.026 0.010 0.032 0.015 0.018 0.032 
2-86 21311 8.9 0.048 0.029 0.018 0.068 0.029 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.068 
2-87 18334 7.8 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.033 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.033 
2-88 21040 9.4 0.042 0.025 0.022 0.051 0.022 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.051 













Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 
  
UPPER MIDDLE LOWER Avg. Max. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
460 Volts @ 20,700 Amps  
2-91 26460 67.3 0.771 0.432 0.236 0.491 0.580 0.525 0.342 0.482 0.771 
2-92 23067 62.7 0.536 0.285 0.270 0.439 0.632 0.542 0.236 0.420 0.632 
2-93 27163 91.2 1.155 0.621 0.388 0.858 0.860 1.126 0.489 0.785 1.155 
2-94 17685 13.4 0.089 0.082 0.061 0.094 0.070 0.084 0.091 0.081 0.094 
2-95 22373 104.0 0.033 0.031 0.020 0.031 0.029 0.017 0.024 0.026 0.033 
2-96 27102 307.8 3.726 1.986 1.226 2.436 2.553 2.560 1.692 2.311 3.726 
2-97 27311 258.4 5.605 2.786 1.294 3.625 3.616 3.608 1.996 3.218 5.605 
2-98 25662 162.0 2.616 1.483 0.776 1.641 2.326 1.817 1.110 1.681 2.616 
2-99 20881 163.4 2.583 1.399 0.751 1.593 2.049 2.900 1.035 1.759 2.900 
2-100 25521 162.0 4.649 1.645 1.923 3.569 3.043 5.573 1.456 3.123 5.573 
2-101 26030 164.5 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 3.477 5.066 
2-102 21848 156.4 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 3.477 5.066 
2-103 24064 164.3 4.954 2.377 2.120 4.235 3.777 5.066 1.809 3.477 5.066 
2-104 24596 162.1 3.694 1.677 1.502 2.712 2.298 2.679 1.431 2.285 3.694 
2-105 24659 162.0 3.234 1.707 1.133 2.441 2.333 2.536 1.185 2.081 3.234 
2-106 21997 163.2 2.908 1.611 1.272 2.214 2.435 2.309 1.105 1.979 2.908 
2-107 25301 165.1 2.943 1.654 1.361 2.238 2.409 2.371 1.289 2.038 2.943 
2-108 24578 162.0 3.546 1.599 1.254 2.276 2.523 2.477 1.069 2.106 3.546 
2-109 17638 163.0 2.532 1.540 1.419 1.995 2.298 2.510 1.207 1.929 2.532 
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